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The ongoing civil war in Syria and Iraq attracts thousands of individuals from all over the 
world (Burken 2015). Most of these foreign fighters are young Sunni Muslim men in their 
twenties with a jihadist motivation (Barrett 2014a: 16). But also Shiites, Christians, Kurds and 
adventure seekers of different nature are pulled to the war zone (Spencer 2015; 
Hilgers/Hensgen 2014). Teenagers can be found as well as elderly (Barrett 2014a: 16); also an 
increasing number of women and girls travels to the war zone in Syria and Iraq (Freytas-
Tamura 2015), either to fight (Yücel 2015) or to marry a fighter (Saltman/Smith 2015). Most 
of the foreign fighters join radical Islamic insurgent groups affiliated to global jihad 
(Hegghammer 2014b: 6). Although the numbers of foreign fighters from Europe and former 
soviet-union states increase, the largest proportion originates from the Arab World (Neumann 
2015). While some Arab countries (Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia or Jordan) export1 great 
numbers of foreign fighters in comparison to their population, others are not reported to 
export any (Comoros; Djibouti) or only comparatively small numbers (Mauretania; Sudan; 
United Arab Emirates; Egypt; Algeria). Again other countries rank in the middle (e.g. 
Somalia; Qatar; Kuwait). By comparing socio-economic-, systemic-, political- and practical 
conditions in 15 Sunni Arab countries, I try to find an explanaton for the widely differing 
numbers of foreign fighters from the respective states.  
The upshot of my exploratory study is – perhaps not surprisingly – that there is no single 
condition that explains the noticable differences between the countries of my sample as 
regarding the export of foreign fighters. Most interestingly is that the combination of a 
modern market system, education and easy accessibility to the conflict zone seems to foster 
the export of fighters. Moreover, the findings show that poor and underdeveloped countries 
export the smallest numbers. Other conditions are apparently less important, but may still be 
relevant in combination with others. Suprisingly Sharia law can in combination with other 
conditions – contribute to the outcome ‘no export of foreign fighters’.  
 
 
                                                             
1 I use of the term “export” to describe the flow of foreign fighters from a country to Syria and Iraq. This is 








1.1 Research Question 
My research question is: What are the conditions in states of the Arab League that lead – by 
themselve or in combination – to a higher or lower number of Muslim foreign fighters from 
the respective states in Syria and Iraq? 
Based on the general assumption that the causes of radicalization are the same for individuals 
living under more or less the same social and political circumstances, I assume that structural 
differences between the Arab States affect the probability with which individuals living in 
these states may be expected to join an armed group in the conflict zone of Syria and Iraq. 
Moreover, I assume, that an explanation for the grossly diverging numbers of foreign fighters 
from the respective states can be found by comparing countries that seem to export few or 
none with other countries that became a mayor recruitment pool for insurgent groups in the 
conflict zone. In my analysis I shall focus solely on foreign fighters that (a) come from Sunni 
majority Arab states and (b) go to Syria and Iraq. My goal is to identify the sufficient and 
necessary conditions for the outcome – i.e. a comparatively high number of foreign fighters 
going to Syria and Iraq. My goal is not to give a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the 
phenomenon of foreign fighters or of the causes of radicalization and terrorism in general. I 
merely analyse the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq coming from states of 
the Arab League and their proportionally higher or lower numbers when compared with the 
population size of the respective countries. Strictly speaking, the findings will, therefore, only 
apply to states of a similar type. If one would, for example, include western states, that export 
foreign fighters, conditions that represent aspects of integration or the situation of the Muslim 
minorities would probably be more relevant (Matthijs/Zahid 2013; Vidino/Brandon 2012). 
And if one thinks of Russia and China, their policies towards regional Muslim minorities (e.g. 
the Chechens and the Uigurs) would seem to be very relevant (Drennan 2015; TSG IntelBrief 
2014). Still, I hope that my findings may help to gain a deeper insight into the phenomen of 











1.2 Methodological Approach  
The approach of this research paper is an inductive comparative case study. I compare 
structural conditions in states of the Arab League and the practical possibilities to become a 
foreign fighter that prevail in these states. By comparing structural conditions in different 
countries, I hope to find patterns that can be generalized and may explain the specific 
phenomenon in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, this research paper is explorative. Prior to my 
analysis, assumptions existed regarding the different variables, yet their importance and their 
reciprocal effects were not known. Therefore the analysis includes a wide range of variables, 
in order to not leave aside relevant conditions for the export of foreign fighters. The analysis 
does not focus on individual choices of single foreign fighters and their way to Syria and Iraq, 
but on the statistical effect of higher or lower numbers of fighters when compared with the 
size of the population of the respective countries. If one takes a look on the phenomenon at a 
global scale, one will find one striking similarity: All countries that export high numbers of 
foreign fighters have a Sunni Muslim population. Either they are historically Sunni majority 
or minority countries, or a Sunni population exists due to immigration. But not all countries 
with a Sunni population do export fighters. By using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA), I want to identify conditions and combinations of conditions that are related to the 
export of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. Arab League states with a Sunni majority are 
chosen as cases. In the QCA-Analysis the conditions are represented by the x-variables. They 
are divided into four categories: socio-economic; systemic; political and practical and derive 
from general theories and assumptions about the causes of terrorism as well as from research 
findings and practical assumptions regarding the accessibility of the conflict zone. The 
phenomenon of interest, the export of foreign fighters, will be refered as “the outcome” and 
be represented by the y-variable of the QCA-Analysis (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 20). 
 
1.2.1 Two Basic Assumptions 
There are two basic assumptions underlying my analysis:  








2. There are at least two necessary conditions for an individual to become a foreign 
fighter in Syria and Iraq: The individual must have (i) the intention and (ii) the 
practical possibilities to become a foreign fighter. 
 
The first assumption 
Research on the radicalization of Islamic terrorists shows that radicalization processes are 
fostered by general social factors (socio-economic situation, state system and grievances 
about certain policies), by personal and psychological conditions and by the general dynamics 
of groups (Sageman/Atran/Davis/Ginges 2009: 5-13; Vidino 2012). Since Islamic terrorists 
and Muslim foreign fighters converge under the banner of global jihad, the same may be 
assumed to hold good for foreign fighters (Bymann/Shapiro 2014: 5ff.; Hegghammer 2011b: 
55). In a joint study about foreign fighters of whom some became terrorists, Ciluffo, Cozzens 
and Ranstorp describe, the close connections between foreign fighters, insurgent groups and 
international terrorist organizations (Ciluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010). Lamya Kaddor, comes 
to similar conclusions in her popular book „Zum Töten bereit. Warum deutsche Jugendliche in 
den Dschihad ziehen.“ (Kaddor 2015). I take it, therefore, that the radicalization processes of 
individuals that eventual decide to get involved in violent jihad – whether by becoming a 
terrorist at home or a foreign fighter – are by and large the same and built on the same 
foundation of grievances, feelings of not belonging and a shared Muslim identity (Sagemann 
2009: 15-24; Ginges 2009: 76). I argue that individuals, living under the same circumstances 
and conditions will, with great probability, take similar decisions in similar situations. This 
does not mean, that there are no exceptions. Single foreign fighters that joined ISIL came 
from the most unexpected countries like Japan, Chile or South Korea (Barrett 2014a: 13; 
Chosun Media 2015; Burken 2015). An important condition for the export of Muslim foreign 
fighters, the existence of a Muslim community, is (almost) not fulfilled and the corresponding 
variable is close to zero. Personal and psychological conditions play, in fact, an important role 
to explain the phenomenon of foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that these conditions are closely correlated with the conditions of the environment in 
which an individual lives. The psychological mindset of an individual, living in a different 








outcome. The French sociologist Èmile Durkheim compared 1897 suicide rates in different 
societies. His groundbreaking sociological study revealed the influence of societal 
environment on suicide rates (Durkheim 1897). Committing suicide is a decision undeniable 
connected to the psyche of an individual, his personal experiences and well-being. I assume 
that the same counts for the – often suicidal – decision to become a foreign fighter.  
The second assumption 
An individual must have the intention to become a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq and the 
practical possibilities to do so.2 The structural conditions that I study are connected to one of 
these two necessary conditions or to both. They may, if they prove to be relevant, either 
constitute necessary, sufficient, or part of a sufficient conditions related to the intentions of 
individuals or to the practical possibilities. Some conditions are intermediary and relate to 
both.   
The Socio-economic conditions (well-being; recruitment pool; education) in a country can 
influence the intentions of individuals to become foreign fighters. They are measured with 
indicators of human development, poverty, age structures and unemployment and education. 
The systemic conditions (economic system; democracy; Islam) are also related to the 
intentions of an individual. They take into account indicators of market freedom, international 
trade, political and civil freedoms and to the role states are based on Islam and Sharia law.   
The political conditions (grievances; counterterrorism) are split. While the variable 
grievances influences the intention of an individual to become a foreign fighter, the variable 
counterterrorism (including legislative efforts to stop the flow of foreign fighters, de-
radicalization programs, the surveillance of mosques, and the promotion of peace) influences 
both, intentions and the practical possibilities. 
The practical conditions [alternatives; networks; accessibility] also relate to intentions and 
possibilities. While accessibility relates to the practical possibility of becoming a foreign 
                                                             
2 One could add the knowledge of an individual that becoming a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq is 
possible and yet another necessary condition. I leave this aside, and assume that due to widespread 
information on how to make it to Syria and Iraq on jihadist web-pages; and because of the media attention 
of the topic (Klausen 2014; Berger/Strathearn 2013) objective accessibility and subjective knowledge 
coincide. Moreover, insurgent groups that recruit foreign fighters leave no doubt that foreign fighter are 








fighter in Syria and Iraq, the variable networks also relates to intentions. The existence of 
networks between domestic terrorist organizations and insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq may 
facilitate access to the conflict zone by means of organizational and financial assistance 
(Levitt 2009), but they also can influence intentions by the promotion of jihad in Syria and 
Iraq (Reidy 2015). The variable alternatives relates to different options of a committed 
jihadist to get engaged (to go to Syria/Iraq or or to some other region of conflict, or to join a 
jihadist organization at home). Unlike socio-economic and systemic conditions the existence 
of alternatives does not influence the radicalization process. The variable measures competing 
offers of jihadi activity for an already radicalized individual.  
 
Fig. 1: Analysed Conditions of the Outcome “foreign fighter” 
The aim of this research is, to find the combination of conditions, seen in fig. 1, that lead to 
the outcome – export of foreign fighters or not. Thereby I assume, that the solution must 
regard to both: (1) Intentions of individuals to become foreign fighters and (2) the practical 
possibility to enter Syria/Iraq. 
 
1.3 Definition of a Foreign Fighter 
A defining characteristic of a foreign fighter is, that he is a foreigner in the country where he 
fights; i.e. that he does not hold the citizenship of that country (Malet 2013: 9). David Malet 








security firms. Unlike combatants of these types, a foreign fighter does not have the mandate 
of a state. Neither is he sent to fight abroad by his home country, nor does he act with the 
permission of the state where he takes action. Malet also characterizes foreign fighters as 
volunteers who are not primarily motivated by financial gain (Malet 2013: 9). Thomas 
Hegghammer builds up on the definition of Malet. He defines a foreign fighter “as an agent, 
who (1) has joined – and operates within the confines of – an insurgency, (2) who lacks 
citizenship to the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) who lacks 
affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) who is unpaid.” (Hegghammer 2011b: 
57f.). Because of these criteria, Hegghammer´s definition excludes transnational terrorists (1), 
members of the diaspora coming back to fight in their country of origin, (2) soldiers (3) and 
mercenaries.  
The data on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, used in this paper, do not indicate which 
insurgent groups foreign fighters join. I assume, though, that most foreign fighters join Sunni 
jihadi groups like the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) nowadays known as the 
‘Islamic State’ (IS) or the Al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate, Jabhat Al-Nusrah (JAN) (also known as 
Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)) and Ahrar Al-Sham (Barrett 2014a: 6; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 
2014: 1). Hegghammer´s criteria (1) and (4) are difficult to apply accurately to the case of 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.   Insurgent groups like ISIL or Jabhat Al-Nusrah that attract 
great numbers of foreign fighters are closely connected to international and transnational 
terrorism or even defined as terrorist organizations (Department of State 2012; Huryyiet Daily 
News 2014; UN Security Council 2014). ISIL repeatedly calls for terrorist attacks outside the 
combat zone and takes responsibility for them.3 The Khorasan Group working in cooperation 
with Jabhat Al-Nusrah, is reported to be the planning wing for international terrorist 
operations of Al-Qaeda in Syria (Lund 2014). The research project ‘Mapping Militant 
Organizations’ by the Stanford University identifies close ties between Al-Qaeda, Jabhat Al-
Nusrah and the international AQ-branch, identified as the Khorasan Group (Mapping Militant 
Organizations 2012-14). Pay as a motivation is another criterion that seems difficult to apply 
to foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova argue that the relative 
                                                             
3 ISIL calls for Attacks against the West and Arab „unbelievers“ in the 8th issue of its Magazine Dabiq 2015. 
Translated and put into context by ‘The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism threat Monitor’ (MEMRI 2015) took 
responsibility for the attack on a museum in Tunis, even though over terrorist organizations also claimed 








pay of skilled and unskilled individuals for participation in terrorist organizations, in 
comparison to the relative pay in the legal sector, can have an influence in the decision 
making of an individual to join a terrorist group (Krueger/Maleckova 2003: 122). This may 
also apply to the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Jessica Stern, a lecturer at Harvard 
University and policy consultant on terrorism, lists money as a motivational benefit for 
foreign fighters joining ISIL. She refers to the term “five-star jihad”, made up by the British 
ISIL fighter Ifthekar Jaman, describing his ‘high life’ at the battlefield in Syria (Stern/Berger 
2015a). Following a NBC Interview of King Abdallah of Jordan, ISIL pays foreign fighters a 
wage of 1000$ a month (nbcnews 2014). Aaron Zelin described – in a conference on ISIL and 
foreign fighters of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy – the “five-star jihad” as 
follows: “In Syria, for example, many foreigners have lived in villas with pools and ones that 
have a video game room.” (Zelin 2015a). Studies and News indicate, that money is not the 
only benefit that may count as pay (Githens-Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014). An increase of 
Palestinian suicide bombers was reported, after Iraq (by than under the rule of Saddam 
Hussein) increased the payments to their left behind families (Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 31). 
Other non-ideological benefits are the prospect of marriage (Stern/Berger 2015a), with a 
sponsored honeymoon, as Russia Today states (Russia today 2015), or loot as a way of 
payment (Malet 2013: 17). Even though, ideology is the dominant factor for individuals to go 
to Syria and Iraq, pay and a risk-benefit calculation also seem to pose relevant. 
The foreign fighters from the countries that were chosen as research cases are predominantly 
Sunni Muslims. Although it is theoretically possible, that the data includes some Shia, 
Christians or Secularists, I assume that the main group is Sunni Muslim. There are no reports 
of foreign fighters with a different religious background from one of the countries chosen as 
cases in Syria and Iraq. Even though, most foreign fighters are Muslims, the degree to which 
religion is a motivation to join an insurgency in Syria or Iraq may differ. Foreign Fighters 
whose main motivation is to help the “Syrian Revolution” or to stop atrocities by regime 
forces are likely to be found in the ranks of more moderate main stream insurgent groups like 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA)4 (Zelin 2013a: 2). Fighters whose motivation is primarily based 
                                                             
4 There are conflicting reports on foreign fighters joining the FSA. Reports, media coverage and statements 








on religious believes, preferably join more extremist jihadi groups, like ISIS or JAN. 
Allthough in both cases, grievance concerning atrocities by the Syrian Regime poses as a 
motivating factor (MAITIC 2014: 1f.).  
I will not make use of a definition of foreign fighters that defines them as Muslims. The 
figures on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq used in this research paper give no evidence on 
their religious background. Nevertheless, Islam is a prominent factor for understanding the 
phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Only countries with a predominantly Sunni 
population were selected as cases for this study and, in any case, my research question can be 
addressed by a definition of foreign fighters that does not inlcude their religious background. 
Still, through the selection of the cases, the analysis focusses on Muslim foreign fighters.  
The definition for foreign fighter used in my study is this: 
An individual, not affiliated to a military organization, who joins, a non-state insurgent 
group in a country where he lacks citizenship or habitual residence. 
 
2 Foreign Fighters in World Politics & Science  
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of foreign fighters in world politics is not new, the 
subject is understudied (Hegghammer 2011a). David Malet – author of the first historical 
comparative analysis of foreign fighters – traces the phenomenon back to the Greeks War of 
Independence against the Ottoman Empire in 1820 and the 1836 Texas War of Independence 
(Malet 2014). The phenomenon of Muslim foreign fighter mobilization in greater numbers, 
began with the Afghanistan war (1979-89). Both subjects, foreign fighters in general and 
Muslim foreign fighters in particular, have not found much attention. Hegghammer argues 
that this is because foreign fighters are “an intermediary actor category lost between local 
insurgents, on the one hand, and international terrorists, on the other” (Hegghammer 2014a). 
The increased involvement of foreign fighters in the civil war in Syria since its beginning 
2011 did not only put the topic on the agenda of governments around the world, but also led 
to an increased scientific interest in the subject. Reports, case studies and analyses have been 
published lately on different issues of the subject. Even though, comparative studies of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
opposite (Letsch 2014).  It is to assume that the FSA, as an umbrella organization, does not have a 








backgrounds and the biographies of foreign fighters from different regions exist, there is a 
lack of a comparative study of the countries of origin of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. 
Given this background, the aim of my study is not to analyze the biographies of foreign 
fighters but the environment in which they lived before they traveled to Syria and Iraq. 
 
2.1 State of the Art 
In this section I shall, firstly, give a synopsis of the state of the art on the subjekt. Secondly, I 
explain which findings of earlier research are important with regard to my research question, 
and, thirdly, I shall explain why research may be valuable addition to previous studies. 
Origins of the Phenomenon & the History of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Important 
research on the subject has been undertaken by David Malet who compared cases of foreign 
fighter involvement in internal conflicts throughout history and Thomas Hegghammer who 
focused on Muslim fighters. Both conclude that foreign fighters are a unique category of 
actors, operating in a conflict zone where they lack citizenship. They are neither soldiers, 
mercenaries, insurgents, nor international terrorists (Malet 2013: 9; Hegghammer 2011b: 58). 
While the definitions of foreign fighters in Malet’s and Hegghammer’s work is new, the 
phenomenon is not. It saw a peak at the beginning of the 20th century with foreign fighters on 
both sides in the Spanish Civil War (Jackson 1994; Othen 2008). A main motivation for 
becoming a foreign fighter was and still is ideology (Hegghammer 2011b: 58). David Malet 
illustrates similarities of transnational foreign fighter recruitment by comparing cases of 
foreign fighters and recruitment mechanisms from the Communist International as well as 
from international violent Islamic organizations. He claims that while in the first half of the 
20th century most foreign fighters were communist, the majority of foreign fighters today are 
Muslims (Malet 2010: 97ff.). Still, there are cases of non-Muslim foreign fighters in 
contemporary conflicts. Foreign fighters join non-Islamic insurgencies in the Middle East or 
other theaters of war and conflict. For instance, Tanja Nijmeier, a Dutch student joined the 
Columbian FARC guerilla (Obermaier 2010). Foreign fighters are also reported to operate in 
the Ukrainian conflict. In spite of many differences, the phenomena of foreign fighters in 
Ukraine and in Syria and Iraq show similarities. In both cases, many fighters come from 








language, religion or ethnic kinship to the conflict zone. Also, both conflicts attract smaller 
numbers of individuals with no direct link to the conflict zone. For instance, Brazilian and 
French foreign fighters joint insurgent groups in the Ukraine (novorossia today 2014). In the 
Middle East, the Syrian and the Iraqi regime also rely on foreign fighters, of which some are 
affiliated with terrorist groups such as the PFLP or Hezbollah (Zelin 2013a: 1). Kurdish, 
Christian, and Shia militias are reported to welcome foreign fighters (Spencer 2015; Zelin 
2013a; Sullivan 2014; Hilger/Hensgen 2014; Chasmar 2014). The by far greatest number of 
foreign fighters joins radical Islamic insurgencies affiliated with global jihad (Barrett 2014a: 
6; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 2014: 1). Hegghammer links the subject of foreign fighters 
closely to the subject of global jihad and refers to the term Muslim foreign fighters, 
describing the phenomenon as a violent offshoot of a new pan-Islamism (Hegghammer 
2011b: 57). jihadist organizations (e.g. AL-Qaeda; ISIL) see the Syrian and other conflicts in 
Muslim areas as a field of opportunity for their ‘jihadist struggle’ (Barrett 2014c). The trend 
of Muslim foreign fighters started with the “Arab Afghan” mobilization during the Soviet 
Union´s war against an Afghan insurgency in 1979-1989 (Hegghammer 2011b; Brown 2011). 
It created a significant movement of up to 20.000 foreign fighters (lowest estimates: 5.000) 
rooted in a globalized Pan-Islamic community (Hegghammer 2011b: 56ff., 61). Exile 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Islamic universities in Saudi 
Arabia and the funding and promoting of pan-Islamism by Saudi Arabia plus geo-political 
conditions are seen as backbones of this pan-Islamic movement (Hegghammer 2011b: 56ff.; 
Chosky/Chosky 2015). Hegghammer maintains, comparable with Martha Crenshaw’s 
rationalistic explanation of the  causes of terrorism (Crenshaw 1981) 5 , that limited 
possibilities to influence domestic politics, drove Islamists to an international level 
(Hegghammer 2011b: 57). However, it is questionable whether this fits the current situation in 
Syria and Iraq. The leading exporter of foreign fighters is Tunisia, where Ennahda, an Islamic 
party with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood is a leading political party. Before losing the 
national parliamentary elections in October 2014 Ennahda constituted the Tunisian 
government (Gall 2014). During their government great numbers of Tunisians left the country 
to fight in Syria and Iraq (MEE 2014; Barrett 2014a). In contrast to the Tunisian Ennahda, 
                                                             
5 Crenshaw argues that a lack of possibilities of political participation, and thus to achieve political aims by 








that remains a strong political force, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was ousted, even 
earlier, from government by a military coup and the group was criminalized (El-Sherif 2014). 
However, Egypt did export fewer foreign fighters than Tunisia (Neumann 2015; Barrett 
2014a). Up to now, the Gulf States (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait) are reported to 
support radical Islamic organizations, even though there is no evidence for direct support of 
ISIL or JAN (Boghardt 2014a; Boghardt 2014b; Becker 2014). If not by direct support for 
such groups, the international spreading of orthodox Islam by Saudi Arabia creates a breeding 
ground for radical Islamists (Chosky/Chosky 2015; Stemmann 2005). The Afghan insurgency 
and their foreign fellowmen were intensively supported by the United States and several Arab 
states, esp. Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer 2011b: 57; Akbarzadeh/Baxter 2008: 98f.). Vahid 
Brown describes the Afghan jihad not as a global jihad between the dar al-Islam (‘House of 
peace’, i.e. the, territory of the Ummah the worldwide Muslim community) and the dar al-
Charb (‘House of War’, i.e. non-Muslim countries or states thought to be hostile to Muslims). 
Instead, he defines the Afghan jihad as a regional conflict restricted to Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, its internationalization through foreign fighters, strengthened those Islamic 
fractions that saw the jihad as an individual duty for all Muslims on a global scale; i.e. a fight 
not limited to Afghanistan but also addressing rulers in Muslim States. The very Muslim 
States that supported the jihad in Afghanistan faced violent backlashes, once the fighters 
came back home (Brown 2011: 230-235). The global jihad is a product of competition 
between independent Islamic elites and Muslim state elites – aiming to advance their stance as 
defenders of Islam by funding foreign fighters in Afghanistan (Hegghammer 2011b: 57; 
Brown 2011). While foreign fighters enjoyed state support in the 1980´s, today most states in 
the Middle East see them as threat; at least since the rapid success of ISIL. Whatsoever, this 
attitude was not consistent since the beginning of the conflict. The strategies towards Syria by 
some Arab States, mainly the Gulf States Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait – states that support 
the Syrian opposition and are reported to have kept their eyes shut to the issue of foreign 
fighters at the beginning of the conflict - seem similar to the elite competition mentioned by 
Hegghammer. Esp. Saudi Arabia, where the Wahabi Islam6 – an orthodox interpretation of 
Islam close to ISIL´s – is a state religion, sees itself as a regional Islamic power and the 
protector of Sunni interests (Weinberg 2013). The legitimation of the Saudi Monarchy relies 
                                                             








strongly on their role as protectors of the holy sides in Mecca and Medina and their role as 
promoter of orthodox Islam. Irrespective of Mecca and Medina and of the fact that Saudi 
Arabia is an international recognized state (and ally of the US) that spreads its Wahabi 
doctrine by different means than ISIL, Al-Qaeda or Jabhat Al-Nusrah, there is a lot in 
common between the Saudi Monarchy and the Islamic Caliphate, esp. the hostile attitude 
towards Shiite Iran (Alfoneh 2013). While Fatwas (religious orders of Islamic scholars) were 
issued by Saudi clerics forbidding to go to Syria, other clerics issued fatwas calling for the 
death of Assad on Television (McGregor 2012). It is a difficult task to draw a clear line 
between Saudi policies (or the policies of Qatar and Kuwait) that are more supportive of jihad 
and foreign fighters and those that are more adversive. Still, one can assume, that due to its 
Islamic legitimacy and the power of clerics, the Saudi government (that strongly benefits from 
its ties to the west) is under pressure from more radical Islamists. It does not openly support 
foreign fighters, as it did in the 1980’s and even took strong action against ISIL and foreign 
fighters. Still, its policies at the beginning of the conflict remain intransparent and it is not 
unreasonable to belief that the Saudi policy towards foreign fighters was inconsistent. Indeed 
inconsistent state policies towards the Syrian opposition and to foreign fighters seem to be a 
relevant factor for the different numbers of foreign fighters that come from the different 
states.  
The “Arab Afghan” mobilization led to a “Blow-Back” effect in countries to which foreign 
fighters returned. Others went on to conflict zones in Bosnia, Somalia or Yemen (Brown 
2011: 93-99; Sela/Fitchette 2014: 56-83; Barak/Cohen 2014: 12-17). Some former foreign 
fighters became jihad-inspired terrorist (Zuijdewijn 2014). The best known example is Osama 
Bin Laden and his terror network Al-Qaeda (Steinberg 2011; Pohly/Duran 2001; Brown 2011: 
89-92). A similar ‘Blowback-effect’ by the current foreign fighters leaving for Syria and Iraq 
is feared by their countries of origin, esp. in Europe, with growing numbers of European 
citizens leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq (Lynch 2013; Byman/Shapiro 2013). Foreign 
fighters do not only pose a danger by filling the ranks of terror organizations after the conflict 
but also have an influence on the conflict itself. By receiving media attention and by posing a 
threat to the governments of their home countries, they globalize local conflicts and 
strengthen an international jihad narrative (Ciluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 2). Hegghammer 








increase of sectarian violence (Hegghammer 2011b: 53). Christine Bakke did research on the 
influence of foreign fighters on indigenous conflicts. She argues that though domestic 
opposition can benefit from foreign fighters, as they strengthen their military weight, they 
often harm the opposition by imposing new agendas, a new definition of the fight and how it 
should be done (Bakke 2014).  
Aaron Zelin sees foreign fighters as a factor leading to an Islamic radicalization of the Syrian 
opposition. Firstly, because they shift the balance on the ground away from secular groups 
towards radical Islamic groups. Secondly by spreading their ideology through dawa sessions 
(proselytism) (Zelin 2013b). For ISIL, toppling Assad is not the main topic of importance. 
Their main preoccupation is the building of an Islamic Caliphate (Leggiero 2015). The 
reported cooperation between the Assad Regime and ISIL supports this conjectur (Barnard 
2015). The non-Islamic Syrian mainstream opposition accuses foreign fighters of taking over 
the Syrian Revolution and of imposing their ideology on Syrian soil (Letsch 2014). Malet 
describes foreign fighters in Iraq, after the US-led intervention 2003, as being more idealistic 
and ideology driven than their domestic counterparts. While the Iraqi insurgency – before the 
outbreak of the Syrian conflict and its spill over to Iraq – consisted only to 10 percent of 
foreign fighters, 90 percent of suicide missions were committed by them. The will to become 
a martyr can be seen as a mayor motivation (Malet 2014: 35). Reports about would-be-
suicide-bombers, who are angry about the nepotism within the ISIL where those who are 
without influential friends in the ISIL establishment were put down on the waiting list for 
suicide attacks (Paraszczuk 2015). 
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Richard Barrett from the Soufan Group and Peter 
Neumann from ICSR, did research on the numbers of foreign fighters in Syria by their origin. 
My study relies on their estimations. The ICSR-Report estimates the number of foreign 
fighters in Syria of above 20.000 from over 60 countries (Neumann 2015). More recent 
estimates refer to more than 80 countries (Burke 2015). The phenomenon of foreign fighters 
leaving for the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq is not limited to the Muslim world, but also 
includes “Western” countries (Neumann 2015; Byman/Shapiro 2014; Barrett 2014a; MSC 
2015: 38). Following Barrett, the most common age of a foreign fighter is 18-29 years 








countries, also indicate the common age to be in the twenties (Weggemans, Bakker/Grol 
2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014; Maher 2013; MAITIC 2014). Atran, Davis, Sageman and Ginges 
published a case study on Islamic terrorist cells in Europe and came to the conclusion that 
individuals radicalize and get recruited for terrorist organization through closed circles or 
radicalization bubbles (Atran/Davis, Sageman/Ginges 2009). Barrett and further researchers 
stress the importance of social media (esp. Twitter and Facebook) for the recruitment of 
foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a: 7; Klausen 2014; Berger/Strathearn 2013). Hegghammer, 
furthermore, analyzes the considerations of western foreign fighters regarding the decision to 
go to foreign jihad battlefields or to engage in jihad at their countries of origin (Hegghammer 
2013). I shall not deal with those who join terrorist groups at home but focus on foreign 
fighters in Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, other proposals to engage in jihad, are a relevant 
factor. There is evidence of competition between local and global jihadi players. An 
explanation for the relative small number of Algerian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is 
partly seen in the refusal of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) to join rebels in Syria. AQIM 
argues that there are already enough open battles in Algeria and Mali and fighters needed 
(MAITIC 2014: 53). Prior to the Syrian conflict and the rise of the phenomenon, Al-Qaeda 
discouraged Western foreign fighters to go to Yemen in its magazine Inspire. They would be 
welcomed in Yemen but more welcomed to commit terrorist attacks in their home countries 
(Mendelsohn 2011: 201). This certainly is not the case with ISIL. The group runs a well-
developed internet recruitment machine to attract foreign fighters (Klausen 2014; 
Berger/Strathearn 2013; Callimachi 2015).  
Motivations of foreign fighters: Motivations and profiles of foreign fighters are in the focus 
of current research. Unfortunately, most authors conclude that there is no clear pattern of 
profiles for foreign fighters. Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp e.g. write: “No single pathway to 
becoming a foreign fighter, nor […] a static profile of the fighters themselves. Ideology, 
social circumstances, adventure-seeking, political grievance, and so on. All appear to impact 
individuals´ choices in this regard.” (Cilluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 38). Other researchers 
are in line with this statement (Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014; Maher 
2013; MAITIC 2014). Still, there are some foreign fighter profiles that appear more often than 
others in their biographies and may give us a clue of what to look for. An idea of the 








foreign fighters. Barrett maintains that, even though, motivation for becoming a foreign 
fighter in Syria and Iraq may vary, the jihadist narrative is most common. Most foreign 
fighters join radical Islamic groups (Barrett 2014a; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 2014). In a 
report for the United States Institute for Peace, Colonel John Venhaus addresses the question, 
“Why youth join Al-Qaeda?”. He emphasizes that the biographies of individuals joining Al-
Qaeda show dissimilarities regarding their social-economic profile. While some were 
unemployed, others were not and had ‘normal’ lives before joining a terrorist organization 
(Venhaus 2010: 4). In general, Venhaus maintains that individuals joining Al-Qaeda show no 
sign of psychological disorder and often do not come from a strongly religious background. 
He differentiates four types of characters that are eager to join Al-Qaeda: 1. The Revenge 
Seeker looks for an outlet for his frustration, perceives himself as a victim of society and 
wants to take revenge. 2. The Status Seeker sees Al-Qaeda as a possibility to gain a social 
status that he otherwisewoud not achieve in a regular course of life. 3. The Identity Seeker 
looks for a place of belonging and his place in society. 4. The Thrill Seeker sees Al-Qaeda as 
an opportunity for a great adventure (cf. Venhaus 2010: 4-11).  
Comparative case studies on specific countries of origin of foreign fighters are mostly based 
on the biographies of foreign fighters and their socio-economic background as well as on 
states policies towards the subject. Similar are studies that attempt to give profiles of foreign 
fighters. They give valuable information on the motivation and the socio-economic 
background of foreign fighters, as well as to state abilities and willingness to stop them. 
Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol analyzed the radicalization process of five Dutch foreign 
fighters. They conducted interviews with friends and people close to them and created 
examplary stories of two fictional average Dutch individual. They depict a Dutch foreign 
fighter as a social, economic and educational marginalized youngster with troubles, searching 
for a purpose in life (Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014). Contrary to this, Maher, who focused 
on British foreign fighters, found that on average they have a higher education level (Maher 
2013). A study on North American foreign fighters, also shows that they “typically do not 
come from poverty stricken neighborhoods but are usually middle-class” (Noonan/Khalil 








Foreign fighters from the Arab World: A joint study by Aaron Zelin, Evan Kohlmann and 
Laith al-Khouri did research on foreign fighters from the four top ‘exporters` of the Arab 
World (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan), using a sample of ‘martyred’, i.e. dead foreign 
fighters in Syria (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013: 3ff.). While drawing on biographies, his 
explanation focuses on political developments in those countries (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 
2013). He does not compare the high ranking ‘exporter’ countries with other in the region that 
do not export many fighters. Their findings suggest that a lack of capabilities to stop the flow 
of foreign fighters in post Arab Spring states explains the high number of Tunisian and 
Libyan foreign fighters. Some of those were active in pro-democracy movements and/or the 
Libyan civil war before they went to Syria (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013: 1-6). The most 
comprehensive study on foreign fighters from the Arab World in Syria and Iraq, comes from 
The Meir Amit Center for Intelligence and Terrorism (MAITIC 2014). Again, the biographies 
of a sample of killed foreign fighters are analyzed. Unlike Zelin´s research, the MAITIC study 
also deals with those countries that do not export significant numbers of foreign fighters. It 
analyses states policies towards the subject and focusses on recent political developments. 
Furthermore the socio-economic background of foreign fighters, their way to Syria and Iraq 
and the groups they join are ascertained through an analysis of their biographies. 
The study comes to several findings: Like other studies, it stresses that the fighters mostly join 
the Jabhat Al-Nusrah or ISISL; only few go into more moderate groups. Arab foreign fighters 
constitute the backbone of ANF and ISIL. The reasons for becoming a foreign fighter are 
religious, sectarian (hate for Shia), opposition to Assad or identification with victims of 
Assad, the quest for socio-economic status, and the desire for adventure. There a different 
profiles of Arab foreign fighters. Some are hard core Salafist and veteran fighters whereas 
others are first time fighters without combat experience (MAITIC 2014: 2). Some come from 
the urban middle class (e.g. Egypt) others from marginalized rural areas (e.g. Tunisia). They 
travel for themselves or with the help of Salafist organizations (MAITIC 2014: 2f.). At the 
beginning of the conflict, some Arab states tolerated the flow of foreign fighters as a mean to 










Resumeé: State of the Art 
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new in world politics. Similarities of different 
occurences of the phenomenon are that foreign fighters are mostly motivated by ideologies 
with an international outreach, be it Communism or Islamism. The phenomenon of Muslim 
foreign fighter recruitment saw a peak with the Afghan jihad and nowadays with the crisis in 
Syria and Iraq. Some patterns are reoccuring. In both cases the policies of Muslim states were 
not consistently hostile to foreign fighters. The Afghan jihad produced blow-backs, such as an 
increase in international terrorism. First signs for such blow-back effects can also be seen 
nowadays. In Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters come from all over the world but predominantly 
from Arab countries. Their motivation is in most cases based on the Islamic faith and they 
preffarably join radical Islamic insurgent groups. There are no clear profiles of foreign 
fighters, but it is mainly a youth phenomenon that often attracts students and middle class 
people from urban areas as well as marginalized rural populations. Often detected underlying 
motivation of foreign fighters are identity crisises and the search for a place of belonging.  
 
2.2 Purpose of this study  
Comparative studies focus mostly on the biographies of foreign fighters and on state policies. 
Case studies focus on single countries that export larger numbers of foreign fighters [e.g. the 
case of Tunisia (Githens-Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014). Still missing is a comprehensive 
approach, comparing the various conditions that can lead to the export of foreign fighters in 
countries that export many and countries that export only few or none. The purpose of my 
study is to analyze the environment, the policies and the practical possibilities to go to Syria 
and Iraq in the countries of the Arab League from which foreign fighters originate. The aim is 
to identify single conditions or combinations of single conditions that make the export of 












3 Foreign Fighters: Cases, Outcomes, and Conditions 
3.1 The Cases: Arab League States 
The selected cases for this research are the states of the Arab league with some exceptions 
that are listed below. Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq originate from over 80 different 
countries (Ackermann 2014). The largest proportion comes from Middle Eastern countries. 
Followed by Europe and the former Soviet Union (Neumann 2015). The predominantly Sunni 
states of the Arab League are chosen as study cases for two reasons: (i) To avoid a selection 
bias (the cases are not handpicked by the author). (ii) These states export the majority of 
foreign fighters. 
Countries with a minority Sunni population (Oman, Bahrein, Lebanon) were omitted, simply 
because the focus of my research is on Sunni Muslims becoming foreign fighters in Syria and 
Iraq and the data I use from the reports of Barrett and ICSR give no information about the 
specific religious backgrounds of the fighters.  
Unfortunately, Barrett and ICSR also do not give precise definitions of a foreign fighter. The 
definition I use in my study excludes organized military groups. Since, there are reports of 
Hezbollah and Houthi combatants fighting alongside Regime forces (Sullivan 2014; Solomon 
2013) the cases of Lebanon and Yemen were excluded from the analysis. An organized 
military force that, reportedly sent combatants to Syria, such as the Hezbollah or the Houthi´s 
is not known to exist in other Arab States. 
The Palestine territories as a non-state member of the Arab league was omitted due to a lack 
of reliable data.  
Selected countries:  Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauretania, 
   Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab 
   Emirates.    . 
Omitted members of the Arab League:  Bahrein, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Yemen, 










3.2 The Outcome: Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq 
My figures of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq come from two sources: A report from 
Richard Barrett of The Soufan Group (TSG), published in June 2014 and a report from Peter 
Neumann by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) from January 
2015. The figures of foreign fighters were updated in the preparation of the UN-Security 
Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014 and were produced in collaboration with the 
Munich Security Conference. ICSR also served as an external advisor in the making of the 
Anti-Foreign-Fighter UN-Resolution 2178 (Neumann 2015). The ICSR-Report of 2015 does 
not include countries, from which less than five foreign fighters originate from, but lists them 
in another report, published in December 2013. Both reports present the figures as ‘conflict 
totals’ – i.e. all foreign fighters that went to Syria since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 – 
and it seems appropriate to add the missing figures of the ICSR-Report from 2013 to the data 
used in this research.  
Fig 2: Figures of foreign fighters7 










The figures are cross checked with the Soufan Group Report for discrepancies, assuming that 
the figures of the more recent ICSR-Report may be higher and should certainly not be 
                                                             








significantly lower. In any case, both reports only give estimates, due to the nature of the 
subject. ICSR explicitely warns “counting foreign fighters is no exact science.” (Neumann 
2015).  
Following the ICSR-Report from 2013 that worked with the same methodology as the Report 
from 2015 the sources of the figures include ”media reports about foreign fighters in English, 
Arabic and several other languages (from both sides of the conflict); government estimates; 
and statements about foreign fighters by jihadist groups, typically published in extremist 
online forums and on social media.” (ICSR 2013). The figures published in the ICSR-Report 
2015 refer to the second half of 2014. The reports used for this research paper (ICSR-Report 
2013 and 2015; Soufan Group Report 2014 by Richard Barrett) only refer to foreign fighters 
in Syria. Still, I believe, that they provide a reliable basis for this study. With the spill-over of 
the Syrian conflict to Iraq, resp. the fusing of the Syrian and the Iraqi conflict in January 2014 
and with the proclamation of an Islamic Caliphate stretching through Syria and Iraq by ISIL 
in June 2014, it is hard to assess where foreign fighters are situated. Those who initially arrive 
in Syria may travel to different fronts in Syria as well as in Iraq. Even though the data are not 
very precise and many details remain unclear, I believe that they are a valuable and basically 
reliable source for a comparative analysis. The numbers of foreign fighters from the selected 
countries differ significantly, and surely they can be used for an exploratory approach to 
analyze differences between these countries. After all, it is not the abolute number of foreign 
fighters but the difference between them that matters with regard to my research question. 
 
Why Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq?8 
The conflict zone in Syria and Iraq is “’the jihad of the moment’ ... It now serves as the latest 
combat safari tour destination of choice for would-be mujahedeen, eclipsing Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia” (Zelin 2013a: 2). There are several reasons why Syria became the 
most attractive battlefield for jihadists from all over the world. One striking reason for the is 
                                                             
8 Compared with Afghanistan in the 1980’s, foreign fighters in Syria receive little support by governments. 
While foreign fighters in the first Afghan jihad relied on the support of governments and intelligence 
agencies from the west and the Arab world (Rashid 2001; Akbarzadeh/Baxter 2008: 96), most 
governments are (at least most recently) concerned about the flow of foreign fighters and eager to stop it 








the location of the conflict zone. Situated in the center of the Middle East and with a border to 
Turkey the region is comparatively easy to reach (Barrett 2014a: 23). Another reason is the 
Islamic theology which inspires insurgent groups. Syria is situated in the ancient Islamic bilad 
al-Shams (Land of Al-Sham=the sun). Al-Sham consists of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Palestine and is mentioned in the Quran and in several hadiths with special regard to the day 
of judgement which, according to the hadiths, is supposed to take place, in Al-Sham at the eve 
of a mayor battle of Muslim against disbelievers (Karouny 2014; Onley 2014). Moreover, 
jihadi foreign fighters compare their travel to Syria and Iraq as doing hijra (emmigration. 
reffering to Prophet Mohammed’s return to Mecca and thus as an essentially religious act, as 
a way of spiritual homecoming (Stern/Berger 2015b). With the proclamation of an Islamic 
Caliphate comprising Syria and Iraq, the allegedly theological obligation to go to Syria and/or 
Iraq is met by the practical possibility to actually live in an Islamic Caliphate. The notion of 
building and living in a “real state”, probably seems more attractive, than hiding in the 
mountain area between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the risk of drone strikes (Yousafzai 
2012).9 A more practical reason, why this research paper focusses on foreign fighters in Syria 
and Iraq is the existing data. For the case of Syria and Iraq, more reliable data can be found, 
than for the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen. 
 
3.3 Conditions: Explaining the Export of Foreign Fighters 
The aim of my study is to identify structural conditions that foster the export of foreign 
fighters to Syria and Iraq from states of the Arab league. The aim is not to identify causes of 
transnational, international or domestic terrorism or civil conflict in general. Nevertheless, the 
two subjects are obviously connected and theories on the causes of radicalization, terrorism, 
and political violence are relevant and will be taken into account.  
 
3.3.1 Necessary & Sufficient Conditions 
As laid out before, I assume that there are two logical and absolut necessary conditions: The 
intentions of individuals to go to Syria and Iraq and the practical possibilities to do so. A 
                                                             








necessary condition must be fullfilled whenever, the outcome occurs. The other way around, 
if a necessary condition is not fullfilled, the outcome must not occur. A sufficient condition 
always leads to the outcome, but the outcome can also occur if a certain sufficient condition is 
not given. If this is the case, another sufficient condition must lead to the outcome. This 
research is based on various indicators that only describe reality to a certain degree. 
Moreover, other indicators that can have an effect on the export of foreign fighters are left 
aside. Therefore, in what follows I shall call necessary and sufficient conditions, conditions 
that explain an outcome with a defined probability, not with absolut certainty. Moreover, a 
combination of conditions can constitute a sufficient conditions. I will refer to these as 
complex sufficient conditions. 
The following analysis identifies eleven conditions that are assumed to have an effect on the 
export of foreign fighters. These eleven conditions fall under four categories: (1) Socio-
economic, (2) systemic, (3) political, and (4) practical conditions. I shall now explain the 
theoretical background of the conditions that I use in my analysis. Other more specific 
conditions that may also seem relevant for the export of foreign fighters were omitted in order 
to reach significant findings by means of an QCA-Analysis, which works better with a smaller 
number of conditions (Wagemann/Schneider 2007: 22).  
 
Data & Sources 
The data on country related structural conditions (unemployment rates, poverty rates, 
economic development) are taken from indices of the World Bank or independent research 
institutions like the Institute for Economics and Peace and the Fund for Peace. The data for 
each specific indicator are taken from the same source for all cases. Missing data for some 
indicators are taken from other sources. The conditions will be further operationalized in 
chapter 4.1. Some conditions like accessibility or the existence of networks are specified and 
assessed on the basis of qualitative research as indicated again in chapter 4.1. 
3.3.2 Socio-economic Conditions 
Socio-economic conditions can have an important effect on the export of foreign fighters. 
From the many socio-economic conditions that can or cannot influence the export of foreign 








measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) and its poverty rate, (ii) Education 
measured by median years of school and university enrollment; (iii) The Recruitment Pool for 
Muslim fighters; a youth bulge combined with a lack of prospects. Studies on foreign fighters 
going to Syria and Iraq often focus on the socio-economic background of foreign fighters; 
their income and their educational level (Cilluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 38; MAITIC 
2014). While some studies find no specific socio-economic profile of foreign fighters 
(Venhaus 2010), others come to different findings in different countries (Noonan/Khalil 2014; 
Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014; Maher 2013). My findings suggest that socio-economic 
conditions have an important effect on the export of foreign fighters. Indeed, higher levels of 
education seem to constitute a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. Well-
being does also effect the export of foreign fighters, but the other way round: All 
combinations of conditions that were identified as sufficient to explain the outcome “no 
export of foreign fighters” included the negated condition well-being. Underdevelopement 
and higher poverty rates contibute to a lesser export of foreign fighters. 
 
Well-being:  Many studies address the question whether poverty causes terrorism. 
Some focus on the national level of overall poverty (e.g. Piazza 2006 & 2011; Abadie 2004). 
Other focus on the specific socio-economic situation of terrorists and their supporters (Tessler 
2007; Blair/Fair/Malhotra/Shapira 2012; Krueger/Maelckova 2002). My findings suggest, that 
irrespective of whether poverty correlates with terrorism or not, it does correlate with the 
export of foreign fighters. The condition is included most complex sufficient conditions 
leading to the outcome, and states that are underdeveloped and share higher poverty rates, are 
more likely to export no foreign fighters. If the export of foreign fighters is understood as a 
result of Islamic radicalization that is caused by the same conditions that also cause terrorism, 
my findings contradict the “rooted in poverty view”, esp. if poor countries where terrorism is 
high as a part of civil war (e.g. Somalia) are excluded. The “rooted in poverty view” suggests, 
that low socio-economic development correlates with an increase of terrorism. Arguing that in 
countries with a poor economic situation, opportunity cost to become a terrorist are low 
(Freytag/Krüger/Meierrieks/Schneider 2011). Other studies do not generally deny a 








Meierrieks and Michael Mousseau findings suggest that urban, not rural, poverty increases the 
support of terrorist organizations (Meierrieks 2012; cf. Mousseau 2015). My own research 
does not address this latter question, because in order to keep the number of conditions 
sufficiently low for the sake of a QCA-Analysis urbanization was was not taken into account. 
Anyhow, several studies, regarding the socio-economic situation of terrorists, foreign fighters 
and support for radical Islamism are in line with my findings. Studies on the background of 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq often state that those who embark are not the poorest 
(MAITIC 2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014: 69). Robbins Tessler who conducted surveys in Algeria 
and Jordan, finds that approval of terrorism is slightly higher by individuals living under 
better economic circumstances (Tessler 2007). A case study on the support for terrorist 
organizations in Pakistan shows, that support for terrorism is greatest in the middle class and 
lowest among the urban poor (Blair/Fair/Malhotra/Shapira 2012). My findings suggest that, 
likewise terrorism, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is not caused by poverty und 
underdevelopment. Rather I find that better off countries export more foreign fighters, if other 
conditions are given. 
 
Education:  A lack of education is often stated by politicians as a main cause of 
terrorism. Tony Blair states that “Terrorism can only be defeated by education” (UN-WebTV 
2013), and the phenomenon arrises “when young people in corrupt countries have no 
education or opportunity”, following Barack Obama (Dale 2015). This assumption makes it 
easier for politicians, to take a normative stance on the subject and to degrade terrorists as 
uneducated people. Moreover, the solution seems be at hand – spread education. 
Unfortunatly, the opposite seems to be true. The findings suggest that better education – 
measured by median years of schooling and university enrollment – is a necessary condition 
for the export of foreign fighters. I argue, that the better the education, the greater the 
expectations (Cramer 2010) and consequently the frustration if expectations are not met in 
reality. Barrett stresses that it´s not the poor illiterate youth who become foreign fighters, but 
literate (esp. literate in the use of social media) youth who share a feeling of not belonging 
(Barrett 2014c). An examplanary case for this situation poses Muhammad A.10. The author 
                                                             








met Muhammed during an exchange semester in Cairo. Muhammed is a well educated 
accountant with a job. Yet, there only few job opportunities for accountants in Egypt and 
there are many young and educated accountants. As a consequence Muhammed’s salary is 
rather modest. Speeking about his situation and his wishes for his future, he strongly 
complained about this situation. Aged 26 he lived at his parents place and could not afford to 
get married and to look for a better employment. He stressed how much he misses a woman in 
his life but that he couldn´t afford it as his salary was very low. He also complained that his 
salary is inadequate given his skills and academic accomplishments. Asked why he does not 
look for a girlfriend (something difficult but not totally impossible in Egypt, if one keeps a 
low profile in doing so) he addmitted that he was confused about that question. On the one 
hand, he kept to traditional values and said that it would be an embarressment for his family, 
if he did; on the other hand he complained about these very values and even addmitted that he 
was jealous for westerners stances towards the issue of dating. Another reason for his 
frustration was his relationship with his father which mirrors the relationship between 
youngsters and repressive regimes throughout the Middle East. He spoke about clashing with 
his father, a retired army officer, and complained that he – a person of great respect to him – 
did not show the right understanding for his situation. He could not even mention criticism 
concerning the underlying causes of his situation as his father was very authoritarian and 
conservative (yet secular). Overall, Muhammed remained confused about the direction of his 
life and the values he should endorse and live by. If one scrolls down on his facebook profile, 
one can see his confusion transmitting into political and religious terms. There is a 
development from posts about his daily life (about his philosophies about life, love and 
success) towards a more critical and confused stance and eventually posts showing admiration 
for strong Arab political figures, and later jihadism. Even though the posts showed admiration 
there were none of directly support or link to particular groups. The posts generally endorsed 
values of independency and men that confront the west and autocrats. They did not justify 
atrocities done by jihadists and some were even critical towards ISIL and Al-Qaeda. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting, that the number of posts of this kind increased, with the 
ongoing civil war in Syria and successes by Islamic insurgencies (some posts had references 








Muhammeds situation is, to some extend, similar to the situation of many men that age, the 
author met in Egypt. Two character types identified by Venhaus and other researcher (Louis 
2009: 125ff.; Venhaus 2010) are exemplified by Muhammed’s case – even though 
Muhammed did not become a terrorist but only flirted with some features of international 
jihadism: First, his expectations of what he would deserve, due to his academic  background 
and his willingness to work, were not met by reality. Second, he was confused about his 
values and was intensively searching for answers and a place of belonging (Venhaus 2010: 4-
10). Studies on the biographies of foreign fighters show that many students and academics 
join insurgencies in Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014; Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013). 
Christopher Cramer stresses this point by arguing, that it is mostly the better educated that 
join insurgencies, not only in the Arab World but in other regions as well (Cramer 2010: 17). 
In addition, “more educated people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate 
in politics, probably in part because political involvement requires some minimum level of 
interest, expertise, commitment to issues and effort, all of which are more likely if people are 
educated enough and prosperous enough to concern with more than economic subsistence 
(Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 144). Krueger and Maleckova argue that better opportunities – 
e.g. in the job market – provided by terrorist organizations can pose as an alternative if legal 
opportunities are rare. Therefore the better educated can be motivated to join terrorist 
organization if they believe that they offer opportunities for leadership positions. Hamas e.g. 
would deliberately select suicide bombers from among the more educated as these are the 
better skilled (Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 122). 
 
Recruitment Pool:  The condition recruitment pool relates to the percentage of 
unemployed youth ages 15-24 of the overall population. It includes indicators of a youth 
bulge and the lack of prospects in a country. Societies with a large share of young 
unemployed bear a potential for violent conflict (Cotright/Lopez 2007: 255; Beehner 2007; 
Heinsohn 2006). Still, some qualifications are necessary with regard to this condition. To 
begin with, also individuals not represented in unemployment rates, may experience their 
situation and life chances as bleak and frustrating. Take the high percentage of lowly paid cap 








Egypt is higher than for none academics; on average, it takes five years to find a job after 
receiving a university degree (Loveluck 2012: 3-13). Hence, the actual recruitment pool for 
foreign fighters in Egypt may be significantly higher then unemployment rates suggest. More 
generally, due to a lack of reliable data, the condition recruitment pool can only be 
operationalized in a rather rough way. In any case, my analysis does not identify the 
recruitment pool as a necessary condition. It contributes to the export of foreign fighters in 
only one sufficient combination of conditions, and the absence of a recruitment pool shows up 
only in one sufficient condition for the outcome “no export of foreign fighters”. The QCA-
Analysis calculates scores comparatively in relation to other included cases. If one takes a 
look on the total numbers of unemployed youth, a rather big recruitment pool exists in almost 
all cases (Qatar sticks out). A recruitment pool might, thus count as a relevant condition, even 
though, relative differences between the case come not out as highly relevant. Cramer argues, 
that unemployment is not the significant condition leading to violent conflicts, but gains 
importance in combination only with other conditions like “political grievances at 
discrimination” and “sectarian mobilisation by political leaders” (Cramer 2010: 18f.). 
Evidence from the civil war in Sierra Leone shows that rebel groups recruited their members 
from “urban drop-outs’ of whom many possesed secondary education and even regular jobs 
but found themselves in a conflict with the elder generation, in which they felt disclosed from 
“decent working opportunities, and wives, all of which were controlled by older men.” 
(Cramer 2010: 22). Cramer concludes:  
„that people’s experience of labour markets often plays an important role in their 
participation in violence. This is so for intimate partner violence, for participation in 
gangs that (often but to varying degrees) use violence, for joining in pogroms, and for 
taking part in insurgencies and civil wars (indeed, possibly also for taking part in 
international armed conflict too)” (Cramer 2010: 24). 
In my view, the lack of prospects youth in the Middle East faces, is not only connected to 
their opportunities on the job market but to an overall lack of prospects to proceed in life 
regarding work, marriage and the founding of a family and the social status. All three parts 
are connected. “Sexual relationships are only approved and remain legitimate in the Middle 








moratorium on intimate life” (Dhillon 2008). With high wedding costs and the tradition that 
the groom financially provides for the bride, income and, therefore, employment are essential 
to get married and to found a family. Family and work are also strongly connected to the 
social status of individuals. Given high unemployment rates in the Middle East, the median 
age of first marriage rises (Dhillon 2008), esp. the better eduacted are affected. While the poor 
work to survive (Dhillon 2008; Heinsohn 2006), academics often wait for years to find an 
adequate job and rely in this time on their parents (Dhillon 2008; Loveluck 2012: 3-13), 
without work and thus without the possibilities to marry and to improve their social status. 
One could also argue in a Freudian sense that a repressed sex-drive, leads to supplementing 
actions and eventually to violence. jihadist insurgent groups offer a great opportunity for not 
only supplementing action but also offer work, marriage and social status in real terms. The 
prospect of pay and loot, work and social status as a heroic fighter and the prospect of 
marriage and even a promiscuitive sexlife with slaves (MEMRI 2014), seem to meet the 
demands of many. Bleak life prospects are also mentioned with regard to Tunisia, where 
young men perceive themselves as facing “la mort, la mort et la mort”. Death by staying in 
Tunisia and being without gainful employment or purpose” (Githens-
Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014).  
 
3.3.3 Systemic Conditions 
My analysis takes account of three systemic conditions: (i) the economic system, (ii) the 
political system, (iii) the role of sharia law in the constitutional legal order. The condition 
economic system was identified as a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. 
 
Economic System:  My findings suggest, that a globalized modern market system – 
measured by the percentage of international trade, scores on how well contracts are enforced 
and on economic freedom is a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. This 
confirms Michael Mousseau’s view that “values and beliefs associated with mixed economies 
of developing countries in a globalizing world” are causes for terror (Mousseau 2002: 5). The 
‘mixed economies’ of many  developing countries incorporate liberal and democratic values 








each other (Mousseau 2002: 6). Here, one can refer to Muhammed, who found himself in 
confusion (whether to get a secret girlfriend as he would personally benefit from it or to stick 
to traditional values held high by his family). Mousseau defines several key differences 
between the two systems. In clientilistic economies parties cooperate on the basis of trust, 
reinforced by gift giving and privilege. Violations are punished by breaking relationships. 
That favors patrons and accordingly a hierachy of patronage. The linkages in clientilistic 
economies are based on kinship, be it ethnic, familiar or religious (Mousseau 2002: 10). In 
contrast, market economies are based on the enforcement of contracts that do not imply 
obligations on parties that are not explicitly listed. The self-interest in negotiating contracts is 
thereby socially approved (Mousseau 2002: 10f.). This “self-interest” is seen in clientilistic 
societies as selfish, and as a sign of cultural and moralical deterioration (Mousseau 2002: 15). 
Hence, it is not a modern market system by itself that causes terror, but the clash of this 
system with a system based on clientelistic values. This clash occurs in developing countries 
where both system, and the values they implement coexist and thus clash (Mousseau 2002: 
26-29). This can lead to identity crisises and the feeling of not belonging, that are repeatedly 
mentioned to be the underlying motivations of foreign fighters (Venhaus 2010; Louis 2009: 
125ff.; Barrett 2014c).  
Another factor related to a market economy is that it can lead, if not accompanied by a system 
of social security, to a lack of personal security (Krieger/Meierrieks 2015). While in 
clientelistic societies, the membership in a family or a clan provides a security net and 
opportunities to proceed in life; in developed market economies the state typically takes over 
these social responsibilities. Thus, with tight job markets and weak or inexisting social 
security institutions, a country may end up with large groups of young people who find it hard 
to make their way. Moreover, one could argue, that clientelistic societies will, naturally fall 
into crisis, if growing populations meet limited ressources. While capitalistic market systems 
rely on economic growth, clientelistic societies depend on limited resources the patron can 
share with his clients (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91-110). Take as an example the traditional 
head of a family in rural Upper Egypt. In accordance with the predominant values of 
manhood, a man’s social status rises if he has a lot of sons. As the patron of his family, he is 








opportunities in one’s business and land, however are limited and in many cases insufficient 
to provide for all those involved an economic basis 
 
Democracy:  The political system of a country can have an influence on the number 
of foreign fighters a country exports. Contrary to the claim that a lack of possibilities for 
political participation leads to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981), my findings suggest that political 
freedoms influences the export in the opposite direction. Indeed, the condition democracy is a 
part of a number of (complex) sufficient conditions that yield the outcome “high export of 
foreign fighters”. And the negated condition democracy is part of a number of (complex) 
sufficient conditions that yield the outcome “low export of foreign fighters”. Democratic or 
partly democratic systems can lead in combination with other conditions to the export of 
foreign fighters, whereas more authoritarian systems can lead in combination with other 
factors to no export. Nevertheless, the leading exporters of foreign fighters include democratic 
states (Tunisia) and authoritarian regimes (Saudi Arabia) and the political system by itself 
neither constitutes a necessary nor a sufficient condition.  
Rational apporaches to explain the causes of terrorism, tend to define it as a mean to achieve 
polical aims, that can not be achieved otherwise (Crenshaw 1981; Özdamar 2008; Sandler 
2014). With regard to ISIL in Iraq and Syria this hypothis can be applied easily. The success 
of ISIL can be explained – not only by their ideological appeal – but also as it is a force that 
fights successfully Shiites Regimes and empowers Sunni populations that were annilihated by 
governemnts composed of Shia and Alawites (Barrett 2014b: 8). Moreover, ISIL made 
itpossible for Baathist strongmen to regain political power (Barrett 2014b: 18-21). This may 
explain, why a Sunni Iraqi or Syrian joins the group. But it does not explain why Tunisians, 
Algerians or Saudis become foreign fighters. One possible rationalistic explanation, refers to 
the political regimes, in which a potential foreign fighter lives in. If he can not achieve his 
aims by peaceful means, he may go to Syria and Iraq instead, in the words of ISIL and the 
JAN, to do Hijra – the migration from “apostate” dictatorships to Islamic territory (Barrett 
2014b: 42; Ali 2014; Alone 2004: 255). Democracies in which Islamic factions participate, 
would then, export less foreign fighters. This hypothesis can be rebuted, however, with 








first elections and Ansar al-Shariah – a group with ties to ISIL and Al-Qaeda (Mapping 
Militant Organizations 2015), could use its new won freedoms to recruit foreign fighters, 
before it was declared a terrorist organization (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013). Also, ISIL 
and Al-Qaeda assert repeatedly their reluctance and ideological antipathy to use democratic 
means to achieve their goals as they see it as heresy (Gause 2005). Moreover the ouster of the 
Muslim Brothers in Egypt, was brandmarkt by Zawahiri as evidence for the failure of political 
Islam by democratic means (Yousssef 2013).  
My findings are in line with research conducted by James Piazza. Piazza suggests, that new 
democracies are more exposed to the risk of terrorism, whereas established dictatorships are 
less exposed (Piazza 2013). Young democracies tend to be more fragile, as they need to 
develop and establish functioning institutions; moreover, their political and social benefits 
need time to be realized and to become visible (Piazza 2013: 247ff.). With regard the selected 
cases, one can see that democracies are situated on both ends of the spectrum. The newly 
established Tunisian democracy exported more than 3000 foreign fighters, whereas the 
Comoros, a more established democracy, exported none. 
 
Islam:   Cultural approaches focus on cultural factors that produce terrorist (Louis 
2009). Indeed, Al-Qaeda, ISIL or Boko Haram11 present themselves as enemies of ‘the West’. 
They do not only see their legitimacy rooted in the Islamic faith, but conceive of their actions 
as obligatory and necessary to live a righteous Islamic life. Their actions are seen as a duty to 
god and and as a response to gods call to jihad.12 This suggests that Huntingtons conception 
of a clash of civilization holds true (Huntington 1999). Islamic fighters from all over the 
world join in Syria and Iraq to establish a Caliphate and eventually to conquer the World.  
The condition Islam is specified by the degree to which Sharia law is incorporated in the 
constitutional and judicial system of a country. Following Huntington, one would intuitively 
assume, that the more shariah law is incorporated the more Muslims become foreign fighters. 
Saudi Arabia may seem to support this assumption. The state is build on an alliance of 
                                                             
11 The name Boko Haram, means: Western Education is sinfull. 
12 [Citation from the speech of ISIL leader Abu Bakr Al-Bagdadi: "Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable 
of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of 








Wahabi clerics and the House of Al-Saud (Commins 2006) and ranks high in the export of 
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and to Afghanistan and other jihadist battlefield in the past 
(Hegghammer 2011b: 61). Due to its Wahabi ideology, the Saudi state, does not only rank 
high in exporting foreign fighters but also in the export of orthodox Islamic believes through 
state sponsored Universities, Mosques schools and kindergartens (Commins 2015: 158-178). 
The clash of cultures is described by Ralph Ghadban as an Islamic concept, because the 
Quran stresses the difference between the ‘House of Peace’ (Dar al-Salam) – the Islamic 
world – and the ‘House of War’ (Dar al-Charb) – the non Islamic World – which is important 
for the Saudi-Wahabi understanding of Islam and also for ISIL´s and Al-Qaeda´s (Fink/Sugg 
2015). 
My findings are, therefore contraintuitive. They suggest that less Islamic states export more 
foreign fighters and this is in need of explanation. Now, many foreign fighters have not been 
raised in strict conservative or traditional Muslim families (Barret 2014b: 9). And they are 
often described as being unsure about their identies and as persons looking for a belonging 
(Barrett 2014c; Venhaus 2010; Louis 2009: 125ff.). I maintain that countries where shariah 
law has long been established as a matter of local Islamic traditions and thouroughly informs 
social life export less foreign fighters (with the exception of Saudi Arabia13) than countries 
where sharia law plays a lesser role. Many Muslim foreign fighters may be properly 
described, as ‘born again’ Muslims that share a radical desire for a consolidated world view 
and identity. Also religious converts often lean towards more orthodox interpretations of their 
faith.14 Salafism and Wahabism were reformist movements with roots in the time of the pan-
Arabic renaissance (Al-Nahda) from the 18th to the 20th centuries. Unlike other movements, 
such as Pan-Arabism, both saw the reason of the crisis in the Arab World – esp. with regard to 
its relationship to dominant western powers – in a failure of Muslims to truly keep to their 
Islamic faith. Their answer to the crisis relies on a purit interpretation of a proper Islamic life, 
as literally described in the Quran and the Hadithes, and in an attempt to get rid of established 
traditions in the Muslim world – and of course of western concepts (Stanley 2005). 
                                                             
13 Even if the Saudi State system, as I believe, is connected to the export of foreign fighters, it is not to say, 
that the Saudi youth differs to other Middle Eastern youths with regard to an identity crisis (Faruqi 2010). 
14 This assumption refers not only to Muslims who become radicalized, but also to traditional catholics 









3.3.4 Political Conditions 
Grievances:   It seems obvious that the condition grievances is relevant for the 
phenomena of terrorism and thus foreign fighters. Piazza argues that protection of the 
integrity of humans – respect for human rights – reduces terrorism (Piazza 2010)15 and the 
same may be expected for foreign fighters. My findings, however, provide no evidence for the 
assumption that grievances by themselve have an effect on the number of exported foreign 
fighters from a particular country. Indeed, it rather seems that the absence of grievances is 
significant to explain the export of foreign fighters. The findings stress the difference of 
foreign fighters and terrorists. One could assume, that domestic grievances – such are taken as 
indicators for the analyzed condition – may lead to an increase of domestic terrorism but not 
to the export of foreign fighters. The answer may lie in a more explicit definition of 
grievances. While, as Piazza suggest domestic grievances increase terrorism, 
‘internationalized’ group grievances could increase the export of foreign fighters. Even if, 
they come from identification with supressed members of the group (e.g. the Muslim Ummah) 
abroad and not from personal experiences (Canter 2009:10f.). This assumptions is stressed by 
the motive of foreign fighters to help the Syrian Sunnis in their fight against the Alawite 
government. In a different study, Piazza finds that failed states promote transnational 
terrorism. He suggests, that citizens from failed states are more likely to commit transnational 
terrorist attacks (Piazza 2008). Assuming that transnational terrorists are slightly closer to 
foreign fighters than domestic terrorists, this again seems contradictive to the findings, esp. as 
the condition grievances is made out of indicators from the Fragile State Index. A possible 
explanation could be that domestic and transnational terrorist groups compete with insurgent 
groups in Syria and Iraq for potential fighters. If one visualizes the scores from the Fragile 
State Index, the scores from the Terrorism Index and the number of foreign fighters by a 
popultion of 100.000, one can see that grievances and alternatives coincidence. Out of Libya, 
the countries with most grievances and terrorism do not rank high in the export of foreign 
fighters. 
 
                                                             
15 Piazza also maintains that the number of terrorist attacks increases with the number of extrajudicial 
killings by the government, but not with torture, oppression of freedom of speech, and political 

















               
 
Counterterrorism:  The condition counterterrorism represents the extent to which 
countries take measures to counter terrorism, foreign fighters and their radicalization, as well 
as the consistency of national policies towards the Syrian insurgency and foreign fighters in 
particular. Indicators used for the condition counterterrorism are de-radicalization programms 
by states and the surveilance and control of mosques and imams by governments. My findings 
suggest, that Inconsistent policies and unsufficient means to counter foreign fighters and 
radicalization can lead to increased export of foreign fighters if other more crucial conditions 
are fulfilled as well. From the seven highest export countries (Tunisia; Jordan; Libya; Saudi 
Arabia; Morocco; Kuwait; Qatar) only Jordanian and Moroccan state policies were identified 
as consistent. On the other side, the UAE and Algeria, two cases were other conditions that 
lead to the export of foreign fighters exist (to different degrees) export only low numbers 
because of effective and strict measures to tackle the issue (US State Department 2013; 
MAITIC 2014; Racelma 2013). Countries with inconsistent counterterrorism policies were 
either influential Gulf States, post Arab Spring States or the failed Somali state. Tunisia 
illustrates the effect of mosque control and surveilance in combination with inconsistent 
policies on radicalization and foreign fighters. With the events of the Arab Spring radical 
preachers, mostly from AST (a group affiliated with ISIL and Al-Qaeda) became active in a 








for AST members and other radical Islamists to operate and spread their views, esp. as 
imams.” (Wolf 2014). Alaya Allani, a Tunisian professor specialized in Tunisian Islamism, 
observed that numerous Islamic associations were founded with money from Qatar and 
private donors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, maintaining that “the main reason why these 
associations had a lot of money is because they were recruiting fighters to Syria.” (Alaya 
Allani citation and source from Reidy 2015). From 2013-2014 the Tunisian government 
regained control of the majority of Tunisian mosques (Reidy 2015). As the conflict is still 
ongoing, little research exists on states attitude towards foreign fighters in Syria. Therefore, 
unfortunate, only little reliable information exists about the issue. Moreover, there are 
conflicting statements and accusations by officials from different states. While the 
inconsistency of Egyptian and Libyan policies towards the flow of foreign fighters are well 
known, Saudi Arabian, Qatari and Kuwaiti policies are more difficult to assess.16  
3.3.5 Practical Conditions 
Networks:  Smuggeling of foreign fighters from their countries of origin to Syria 
and Iraq and their local recruitment rely on networks of domestic organizations with insurgent 
groups in the conflict zone.17 Insurgent groups that operate in Syria and Iraq maintain houses 
in transit countries (esp. Turkey), close to the Syrian border to smuggel foreign fighters into 
the conflict zone (BBC News 2013a). My findings show, that networks of domestic 
organizations with Syrian/Iraqi groups can have an effect on the number of foreign fighters. 
However, they are not a necessary condition. Radical islamic insurgent groups (esp. ISIL) 
also recruit their fighters intensively via the internet (Carter/Maher/Neumann 2014) and use 
networks to bring them from neighboring countries into Syria and Iraq (Letsch 2015). Aaron 
Zelin finds that the largest “foreign recruitment networks” exist in Saudi Arabia, Libya and 
Tunisia (Zelin 2013b). These three countries were also identified as harbouring strong 
networks in my analysis. Following my analysis, other strong networks exist in Morocco, 
Somalia, Algeria and Egypt. My operationalization did only partly include networks that are 
actively recruiting foreign fighter for Syria and Iraq and also counted affiliations of terrorist 
                                                             
16 For a more detailed argument in which sense states policies  may be assessed as inconsistent see chap. 
4.1.4 ‘Operationalization: Political Conditions – Counterterrorism’. 








organizations with Syrian and Iraqi insurgent groups and friendly contacts between them, that 
may not lead to the transfer of foreign fighters. 
 
Alternatives:  There is only little empirical research addressing the decision making 
processes of commited jihadists, whether to take violent action in the domestic or in the 
international arena. In a study confined to European foreign fighters in Syria, Hegghammer 
finds that individuals’ commited to the path of jihad preferably join insurgent groups abroad 
rather than to engage in terrorist attacks at home. Hegghammer concedes, though, that his 
findings might not fit Middle Eastern countries with strong terrorist organizations and active 
insurgency groups (Hegghammer 2013). Evidence of AQIM, calling youth not to join Syrian 
insurgencies instead of fighting in North Africa, suggest that Islamic insurgency groups and 
terrorist organizations compete for foreign fighters (Watanabe 2015; MAITIC 2014). I take it 
that Syria and Iraq are prefered destination of jihadists (Zelin 2013a: 2; Neumann 2015). 
My findings show, that alternatives can have an effect on the number of foreign fighters 
leaving a country to go to Syria and Iraq. The condition alternatives is included in some of the 
(complex) sufficient conditions leading to the export of foreign fighters. Still, Tunisia and 
Libya, two leading exporters also provide splendid opportunities for jihad. Therefore I argue 
that allthough alternatives play a role, its relevance gets smaller if the pool of potential 
foreign fighters increases. 
 
Accessibility:  The condition accessibility reflects the simple truth that an individual 
needs to be able to get to Syria and Iraq in order to become a foreign fighter in that region. 
The condition as specified in my analysis, however, does not include foreign fighters that 
enter transit countries by illegal means and than cross into Syria or Iraq. Although foreign 
fighters and terrorist are certainly not actors that only use legal means, I assume that the 
export of foreign fighters increases, if the opportunity costs of traveling are low, because of 
easy (legal) access. Most studies confirm that the majority of foreign fighters are not jihadist 
veterans but first time fighters, and it seems reasonable to assume, that many of them, lack the 
skills and connections which are necessary to bypass border controlls without being caught by 








dramtical increase of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is due to the good accessibility of the 
region (Barrett 2014a: 23). The condition accessibility has been identified as the most 
significant necessary condition. It is included in all sufficient combinations of conditions that 
lead to the export of foreign fighters, as well as negated accessibility is included in all 
sufficient combinations of conditions leading to no export of foreign fighters.18 
   
4 The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
This research aims to identify the conditions that lead to the export of Muslim fighters to 
Syria and Iraq. The figures on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq used in this analysis do not 
indicate their motivation and religious believes, as said before, most foreign fighters join 
radical Islamic insurgencies. The aim is to find structural social conditions that lead to the 
export of foreign fighters or combinations of such conditions. In order to identify 
combinations of conditions, I use a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The method 
was introduced by Charles Ragin in 1989 and later modified by him in several ways (Ragin 
1989, 2000 & 2006). QCA-Analyses include a variation of several different methods grouped 
in the QCA-Method family (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 20). The conditions that can lead to 
the export of fighters are heterogeneous. At least two necessary conditions need to be 
fulfilled. One regarding to the intention of an individual and one to his practical possibilities. 
This is not to say that only two conditions will provide a satisfying explanation. Given the 
range of possible conditions that could increase or decrease the export of foreign fighters and 
their diverse occurrence in the cases (15 States of the Arab League) there is a wide range of 
combinations that can explain the phenomenon. A QCA-analysis has the advantage to 
organize complexity and to combines qualitative and quantitative research 
(Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 20). Qualitative research and the researchers knowledge 
contributes to the analysis, esp. in a comparative cross country analysis, where the different 
cases are structural different and thus difficult to analyze by means of statistics only (Trueb 
2012). Another argument for the method is the small number of cases (I compare 15 
countries) that precludes a statistical analyisis. Schneider and Wagemann put the minimum 
number of cases for a meaningful statistical analysis on 50 (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 25). 
                                                             








The QCA-analysis serves to find the necessary conditions as well as combinations of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that explain the phenomenon. In a QCA the single 
conditions are dependent on each other. Together, they can have an outcome, as the cases and 
the conditions are put into context (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 14f.). If a country scores a 
high outcome when a certain condition is not fulfilled, the latter is, strictly speaking, not a 
necessary condition. A sufficient condition leads to the outcome – the export of foreign 
fighters, whenever the condition is fulfilled. There can be cases, however, in which the 
outcome occurs even though a sufficient condition is not fulfilled, because there can be more 
than one sufficient condition (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 32).  
 
Fuzzy-set QCA 
From the several QCA methods, I chose a Fuzzy-Set QCA (fsQCA), a program for QCA 
analysis on the basis of Boolean algebra (Ragin 2006). In a fuzzy-set analysis, the figures are 
calibrated into a spectrum, ranging from 0.0 – 1.0 (Ragin 2008: 30). The scores indicate the 
grade of membership of the conditions as well as the grade of membership of the outcome. A 
full membership scores 1 and a full non-membership scores 0 (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 
184). Hence, gradations of membership are possible (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 177). As 
an example I use the outcome “foreign fighters”. Tunisia exports 28 foreign fighters of a 
population of 100.000; Jordan exports 23. The calibrated values of both have a QCA score of 
1 and are fully in the target set, i.e. they share a full membership. Kuwait export two foreign 
fighters per 100.000 and has a score of 0.62, i.e. they are “more in than out of the target set” 
(Trueb 2012: 6). Qatar, that exports 1 foreign fighter per 100.000, scores [0.49] and is defined 
as “more out than in the target set” (Trueb 2012: 6). Djibouti and the Comoros, from where no 
foreign fighters are reported, are scored [0.02] and are fully out of the target set. The cross 
over point is [0.5]. Values above it are more in the target set, i.e. more full members. Values 
beneath it are more out of the target set, i.e. full non-members (Trueb 2012: 7). The score of a 
variable also includes a theoretical assumption. The higher the score, the higher the outcome. 










In this chapter I will first describe the methods used to operationalize the raw data into 
conditions, necessary for the fsQCA-Analysis. Afterwards I will expose the operationalization 
and the theoretical assumptions of each condition in detail. 
 
4.1.1 Calibration & the creation of Indices 
Calibration means the process of scaling the raw data into figures useful for a Fuzzy-set 
analysis. The figures are situated, as stated previously, on a scale from 0 – 1, regarding their 
membership status (Ragin 2008: 9). There are two ways of calibration. In the first, I use 
fsQCA to transform the figures of the raw data in fuzzy-set scores. This happens via an 
algorithm of the program. I use the first and third quartile and the median as cut-off points, 
defining the borders between the different levels of membership. For almost all of the final 
conditions, of which some are made by the creation of indices, I used the quartiles and the 
median.  
The median measures the location of values in the center of a list of different values. The first 
and third quartile measure the location of value in the first and last quarter of a value in a list 
of different values. They describe the reality of single cases more explicit than the average, as 
they leave out cases that are far from the average. Most cases are calibrated with the use of 
median and quartiles. Exceptions are indicated. 
The second way is to set the fuzzy-set scores by theoretical assumptions; i.e. ordering the 
conditions of cases on a spectrum from 0-1. The condition “Islam” and several sub-
components of conditions are not determined through calibration. The values of the variable 
“Islam” and of some sub-components, used for the creation of indices, were given by 
theoretical assumptions on the basis of qualitative research and were not taken from data 
banks. For other sub-components I also do not used quartiles and the median, but set the cut-
off points following theoretical assumptions.  
For the creation of indices conditions, I used logical AND, logical OR or the average of 
previously calibrated sub-components. Logical AND creates a condition, by aggregating sub-








(Trueb 2012: 9). Logical AND is, thus, the more stricter parameter. A country needs a high 
mempership score in all sub-components, in order to score high (Trueb 2012: 9). Logical OR 
creates a variable, by aggregating sub-components on the basis of the smallest score of the 
sub-components in a case (Trueb 2012: 9). Logical AND sets the crossbar high for a country 
to reach full-membership; logical OR sets it lower. The choice for a type of index creation is 
based on theoretical assumptions (Trueb 2012: 9f.).  
In cases, where a discrepancy between sub-components exists, due to missing information in 
one sub-component or fluctuation of values during the time of the conflict, I chose the 
average. E.g. the condition counterterrorism is created by the aggregation of the sub-
components consistency of government policies and De-radicalization campaigns & mosque 
surveilance. Some cases score high in de-radicalization but low in consistency. Efforts to stop 
the flow of foreign fighters exist, but it is not clear whether they were implemented due to 
inconsistent policies throughout the conflict in Syria. In a QCA-Analysis, 0.5 scores are 
ignored, as they do not fit on one side of the membership scale. The analyst has to change 
these scores either to 0,49 or to 0,51, refering to his knowledge of the case. Changes will be 
presented in the footnotes. In calibrating the conditions, I follow substantive assumptions as to 
whether the respective conditions lead to the outcome or not. My working assumptions will be 
explained in the following operationalization. Three conditions (Islam, alternatives, 
counterterrorism) are assumed to lead to “no export of foreign fighters”. Therefore, a full-
membership 1 in Islam, for exapmple, means that a case is a fully secular state.  
I will depict each calibration formula in order to guarantee scientific traceability. 
 
4.1.2 Operationalization: Socio-economic Conditions 
Well-Being [WELL] 
The condition well-being specifies the development and the poverty levels of the selected 
countries. 
Hypothesis: The better off a country is the more foreign fighters are exported. 
The condition is created by an aggregation of the UN-Human Development Index (HDI) 








summary value of aggregated indicators about “key dimensions of human development”, such 
as “a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (UN-
DP 2014).19  The figures of both sub-components were calibrated using the first and third 
quartile and the median and scores with a value of 0,5 have been changed.20 
compute: hdi = calibrate(hdi,0.79919,0.717,0.48739) 
compute: pov = calibrate(pov,0,2,19.3) 
I chose logical OR to aggregate the sub-components poverty and HDI into the condition well-
being. Thereby the highest score of each case is selected. The HDI is assumed to be more 
significant than poverty, as it includes indicators of poverty. The sub-component poverty was 
used to include cases where the calibrated scores of the HDI are higher than the scores for 
poverty. The assumption is, that in these cases, (e.g. Djibouti, Morocco) the relative well-
being of a country is lesser, even if poverty does not surpass the HDI. Since my assumption 
is, that low poverty and a high HDI lead to the export of foreign fighters, a full membership of 
the sub-component HDI means that the HDI is high in reality, while a full membership in 
poverty means, that poverty does not exist in that country.  
 
Education [EDU] 
The condition education specifies the educational level in the selected countries. 
Hypothesis:  The higher the level of education in a country the more foreign fighters are 
exported. 
The condition is an index aggregated by merging the sub-components mean years of 
schooling in 2012 and the percentage of tertiary enrollment of the school age population of 
2012 (UN-DP 2014).  
                                                             
19 The poverty rate of Algeria is taken from a different source (United Nations 2010). The reference years 
for the figures range from 2002-2010. Inacuraccy due to the span of time of 8 years, are to be composed 
through the aggregation with the HDI. Figures for poverty rates (beneath 1,25$) in Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are not available. Further research did not give evidence that 
people in these countries live below the poverty line of 1,25$; even though relative poverty exists. E.g. 
Saudi Arabia (France 24 2011). 








The sub-components were calibrated using the quartiles and the median: 
compute: school = calibrate(school,8.153,6.477,3.789) 
compute: uni = calibrate(uni,33,15.5,11.5) 
To aggregate the sub-components into the condition education, I used logical OR. I assume, 
reffering to Venhaus, that a motivation of becoming a foreign fighter is the feeling that one 
does not get what one deserves and that one is a victim of society (Venhaus 2010: 8ff.) The 
better the education, the greater the expectations (Cramer 2010) and consequently the 
frustration if expectations are not met. Studies show that many students join insurgencies in 
Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014). Christopher Cramer stresses this notion by arguing, that it is 
mostly the better educated that join insurgencies. Not only in the Arab World but in other 
regions as well (Cramer 2010: 17). I assume, that feinted expectation of university students 
and absolvents are only slightely different from those without an university degree but with a 
longer during education. One can even imagine, that more median years of schooling in 
combination with smaller university enrollment numbers lead to frustration and thus to an 
increased export of foreign fighters (Cramer 2010: 16ff.). Therefore, I use logical OR, to 
aggregate the condition by the highest scores. 
 
Recruitment Pool [RECRUIT] 
The condition recruitment pool specifies how many potential foreign fighters exist in each 
country. A potential foreign fighter is defined – only for this condition – as an unemployed 
individual aged 15-24. I recognize, that this definition does not enfold all potential foreign 
fighters. The measurement was chosen due to a lack of data on unemployed populations aged 
18-30; the average age of foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a, p.16). I argue, that the condition still 
can help as an apporach to measure the trend in a country.  
Hypothesis: The greater the recruitment pool the more foreign fighters are exported. 
I calculated the percentage of unemployed youth ages 15-24 of the total population. The 
percentage of youth unemployment rely on World Bank figures from 2010 (World Bank 








population, but only the unemployment rates of youth.21 Figures on age groups were taken 
from the United Nations Department of Economics and social Affairs. They also refer to 
estimates from 2010 (UN-DESA 2012). 
The figures on youth unemployment and the figures of age groups were calculated to identify 
the percentage of unemployed youth of the total population. This figure was calibrated using 
the quartiles and the median: 
compute: recruit = calibrate(recruit,5.785,4.36,2.785) 
 
4.1.3 Operationalization: Systemic Conditions 
Economic System [ECON] 
The condition economic system specifies how ‘modern’ the market system of a country is. 
The condition was included following the thesis of Michael Mousseau that terrorism is caused 
by the clash of a modern market system values with values based on clientelistic economic 
system  (Mousseau 2002).  
Hypothesis: The more modern and globalized a market system in a clientelistic society is, 
the more foreign fighters are exported. 
Mousseau sees the social value of contracts, enforcable by law, as a factor based in a modern 
market system (Mousseau 2002: 10f.). The World Bank gives scores on how efficient the 
judicial system of a country enforces contracts (World Bank Group 2015). The scores are 
assessed “by following the evolution of a commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods 
and tracking the time, cost and number of procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff 
files the lawsuit until payment is received.” (World Bank Group 2015). Further indicators that 
constitute a modern market economy are its economic freedom [scores from the heritage 
foundation (Heritage Foundation 2015)] and the grade of globalization [measured by 
international trade as percentage of the GDP (UN-DP 2014)]. Increased international trade 
requires some changes in the domestic economic system, as one has to deal with international 
                                                             
21 Unemployment rates for Djibouti were not available from the World Bank and were added from another 
source that published the overall unemployment rates of Djibouti and assumed that youth unemployment 
is much higher (African Economic Outlook 2012). Hence, I took the unemployment rate (54%) and 








partners, who are not part of the clientelistic system. The scores of `economic freedom´ are 
made out of four indicators by the heritage foundation: “Rule of Law”; “Limited 
Government”; “Regulatory Efficiency”; “Open Markets” (Heritage Foundation 2015). 
The figures of the condition are created by aggregating the sub-components: `economic 
freedom`; `international trade as percentage of the GDP`; `enforcing contracts`. The figures 
were calibrated using median and quartiles: 
compute: ecofree = calibrate(ecofree,62.3,57.5,51.085) 
compute: contract = calibrate(contract,56.295,52.52,42.225) 
compute: trade = calibrate(trade,101.537,86.591,50.1962) 
For the index creation, I used logical OR, assuming that the highest factor is sufficient to 
constitute a modern market economy.22  
 
Political System: Democracy [DEM] 
The condition democracy (fsQCA shortcut dem) measures the level of political and civil 
freedoms in a country in the time span from 2011-2014. 
Hypothesis: The more democratic a country is the more foreign fighters are exported. 
The figures are taken from the Democracy Index of Freedom House (Freedom House 2015). 
Because of wide changes of the Freedom House scores between 2011-2014, caused by the 
events of the Arab Spring, I took the average of the scores of these years and calibrated them 
using quartiles and the median:23 





                                                             
22 Djiboutis score of economic freedom was changed to 0.49. Djibouti scored low in the other sub-
components, thus this adjustment seems legitimate. 
23 Qatar, Djibouti, Algeria, Mauretania and Jordans score were changed to 0,49. All scored 5.5 (Freedom 









The condition Islam specifies the degree to which a states judicial system is based on Sharia 
law or secularism. A full-membership of the condition is the case of a fully secular state. 
Hypothesis: The more secular a state is the more foreign fighters are exported. 
I categorized the cases into four groups: 
Fig. 4:  Islam in the Constitution       
Secular state 
   
1 
PS 
    
0,66 
PS/CS + Hadd Penalties24 (regional or for selected crimes) 0,33 
Absolut sharia state 
 
    0 
 
The categorization is orientated on the judicial country profiles, by the US Library of 
Congress (Library of US Congress 2015). 
The only fully secular state is Tunisia; PS refers to countries where Sharia law applies to 
personal statue issues: Jordan; Morocco; Kuwait; Algeria; Egypt; Djibouti; PS/CS refers to 
countries, where Sharia Law is apllied in personal statue issues and for some criminal cases. 
Hadd penalties can exist regional or for specific crimes only: Libya25; Comoros; Qatar; UAE; 
Absolut Sharia States, where Sharia law is applied for the personal statute and all crimes are: 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Mauretania and Somalia.26 
The sources for the categorization will be found in table form in the bibliography. 
 
4.1.4 Operationalization: Political Conditions 
Grievances [GRIEV] 
The condition grievances specifies the level of grievance in a country. 
                                                             
24 Hadd Penalties are for crimes against god and are punished follwing Quran and Hadithes. E.g. 
decapitating, stoning, cruzification, amputations (Johnson/Sergie 2014). 
25 Libyas criminal penal code does not include Sharia. But the country is de facto parted into at least two 
parts, where one part is held by Islamists applying Sharia law. 
26 Likewise Libya, Somalias penal codes does only apply Sharia law for issues of the personal statue. 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of government and the territory hold by radical Islamic groups, I take it to be 








Hypothesis: The more grievances Muslim citizens have the more foreign fighters are 
exported. 
The figures for the condition were taken from the Fragile State Index “The Fragile States 
Index is based on the twelve primary social, economic and political indicators of the CAST 
methodology, developed by The Fund for Peace.” (Fragile State Index 2015). I calibrated the 
sum of the indicators “group grievance”, “human flight”, “uneven development”, “legitimacy 
of the state”, “public services”, “human rights” and “security apparatus” with quartiles and the 
median. 
compute: griev = calibrate(griev,52.3,47.4,43.35) 
 
Counterterrorism  [NOCT] 
The condition counterterrorism specifies the extent of measures to stop the flow of foreign 
fighters, their radicalization and financing and the consistency of these policies. A full-
membership means that a country lacks consistent counterterrorism policies. 
Hypothesis: The less efforts in counterterrorism a country consistently undertakes, the more 
foreign fighters are exported. 
I recognize that this condition is double sided. Efforts in counterterrorism and de-
radicalization can also be a sign for a higher level of radicalization and terrorism in a country. 
The condition does not specify government capacities of counterterrorism. Figures on the 
numbers of security forces outside the military force, and their effectivnes are hard to get.  
The conditon counterterroism is aggregated by the use of two sub-components. One sub-
component is the consistency/inconsistency of a country´s anti-foreign fighters policy over 
time; the other is an estimated value of state campaigns to decrease radicalization and to 
prevent the proliferation of radical terror organizations and insurgent groups. It includes de-
radicalization campaigns by the government, the surveilance of mosques and the promotion of 
peace. In 2011-2013 some governments supported the flow of foreign fighters or accepted it. 
Some states changed their policies with increasing numbers of foreign fighters joining radical 
Islamic groups like ISIL and with the sudden advances of these very groups. Other Arab 








as happened in Tunisia or Egypt, affected the policy towards the Syrian opposition and/or the 
flow of foreign fighters to the conflict zone. Pressure from the United States to adopt and 
implement the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 is also a possible explanation for 
changes to stricter laws and policies by some governments. Following the UN Resolution 
many Arab states implemented laws to criminalize foreign fighters and to stop them from 
going to Syria and Iraq (Drennan 2014). All cases, as members of the Arab League, officially 
recognized a threat posed by ISIL in the second half of 2014 (Noueihed/Fahmy 2014; UN-
Security Council 2014). This is not to say, that means of counterterrorism are applied in all 
states equal. 
In order to merge the sub-components inconsistency and policies I use the average. 
Inconsistent states are valued binominal [Inconsistent: 1; consistent: 0].  
Counterterrorism policies scores are created by the addition of scores coming from state 
categorization: 
          Fig. 5: State Policies 
CT: State Policies   
[A]  Absolute mosque control by the state 2 
[A]  Surveilance of mosques 1,5 
[A]  Existence of Imans who preache against a violent Islam 1 
[B]  Politicians and religious institutions promote a peacefull 
Islam 1 
[B]  Awarness campaigns; Promotion of peace 0,5 
[C]  Re-Radicalization and Re-integration campaigns in 
prison 0,5 
 
The scores are orientated on the counterterrorism country profiles of the US-State Department 
2013 (US-State Department 2013). They are created by the following procedure: Each case is 
assigned two one of the scores of the categorization [A], [B] and [C] or zero. The scores are 
afterwards summed.  
In the following I will make an argument for the categorization of each particular case into 








Inconsistent: States that once supported (or at least are reported to do so) the flow of foreign 
fighters to Syria and Iraq or that let it willingly happen: Saudi Arabia; Qatar; Kuwait; Egypt; 
Tunisia; Libya; Somalia. 
Saudi Arabia condemned the Assad Regime and supports the Syrian opposition with arms, 
political and religious backup since the beginning of the conflict (Schanzer 2012) The Meir 
Amit Center for Intelligence and Terrorism’ suggests 2013 that Saudi Arabia supports the 
Syrian opposition not only with weapons and arms, but also with foreign fighters (MAITIC 
2014: 82). Following Zelin, the Saudi government did not deter its citizens from going to 
Syria before 2014 (Zelin 2014a: 14) In 2014 the Saudi government designated ISIL and the 
Al-Nusrah Front as terrorist organizations and gave their citizens 15 days to return or to face 
prison. Since February 2014 joining insurgencies overseas is forbidden by royal decree and 
can be punished by 20 years of prison (Al-Jazeera 2014b). Saudi Arabia is a member of the 
ANTI-ISIL coalition and even contributes with airstrikes (Drennan 2014). 
Qatar also was an early country to condem the Assad regime and to openly side with rebel 
forces in Syria. Likewise Saudi Arabia it supported the Syrian opposition with arms, money 
and political and religious aid and legitimation (MAITIC 2014: 91). Even though the Qatari 
government denies it, the country is often claimed to support radical Islamic groups in Syria 
and Iraq. The country is said to act as a middleman between Libya and Syrian Rebels to 
support the Syrian insurgency (Abouzeid 2013). The country officially condemns radical 
Islamic insurgent groups and is a member of the ANTI-ISIL coalition (Drennan 2014).  
Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Kuwait also condemned strongly the Assad regime and 
supported Syrian rebel forces. Following the MAITIC-report, Kuwait allowed its citizens to 
support Syrian insurgent groups with donations and to join them as a foreign fighter. 
However, state officials deny this claim (MAITIC 2014: 90f.). The country is also a member 
of the ANTI-ISIL coalition and imposed a law banning the financing of ISIL in (Drennan 
2014). 
Egypt and Tunisia also fall into category [1]. In difference to the previous three Gulf States, 
the inconsistency towards the issue is due to government changes. At the beginning of the 








the events of the Arab Spring. Their governments were not stable and preoccupied with 
domestic turmoil. Even though the governing Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (through its 
Freedom and Justice Party) and the Tunisian Ennahda differ in their profiles and their sense 
for democracy, both governments shared sympathy for the Syrian uprising. The Ennahda 
Government is said to not have prevented the flow of Tunisian foreign fighters to Syria. 
Pressure from families, whose relatives went to Syria and criticism of the Tunisian Media led 
to first steps to stop the flow of foreign fighters. (MAITIC: 45f.). With the change of the 
Tunisian government and greater numbers of Tunisians joining insurgency groups in Syria 
and Iraq (or Libya), the Tunisian govenrment nowadays sees the phenomenon as a threat and 
takes measures (Reidy 2015). While Ennahda support for foreign fighters going to Syria, is a 
subject of discussion, the Egyptian Government under the reign of the Muslim Brotherhood 
openly supported their citizens to go to Syria. In July 2013 a senior Egyptian official stated 
that Egyptians were free to join insurgencies in Syria. The policy was changed after the ouster 
of Mursi (MAITIC 2014: 65). The new Egyptian military Regime sees Islamic terrorists and 
Insurgent groups (it also counts the Muslim Brotherhood as such) as a menace and takes 
action against them in Egypt as well as in Libya (Gearan 2014). 
Likewise Egypt and Tunisia, Libya´s policies towards its citizens leaving for Syria and Iraq 
can also be explained with the turmoil of the civil war and the ouster of the Ghaddafi Regime. 
The Libyan government had neither the will nor the means to prevent foreign fighters going to 
Syria. In February 2013 the Libyan foreign Minister stated that the government could not stop 
Libyan citizens to go to Syria (MAITIC 2014: 32). At least some officials allowed or even 
sent arms and foreign fighters through Turkey or Northern Lebanon to Syria (Abouzeid 
2013). Even if the official Libyan policy may have changed, the capabilities of the 
government to stop the flow of foreign fighters are restricted by the situation in the country. 
The case of Somalia is also classified as inconsistent [1]. Somalia counts as a failed state 
where the government does only control a third of its capital (Dickinson 2010). Hence 
consistency in Somalian State policies seems irrelevant. But with a government incapable of 
controlling its capital, we may safely assume that actions to prevent its citizens from going to 








Inconsistent:  States where no policies (official or unofficial) are reported in favor of 
foreign fighters and the Syrian insurgencies: Algeria; Jordan; Comoros; Djibouti; Sudan; 
UAE; Mauretania; Morocco. 
 
4.1.5 Operationalization: Practical Conditions 
Networks [NET] 
The condition networks measures the existence of networks between domestic terrorist 
organisation and insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq. Networks can increase the intention to go 
to Syria and Iraq, with domestic organizations propageting the jihad in Syria (Wolf 2014) as 
well as increase the possibilities of individuals to get to Syria and Iraq, as I assume that they 
developed capabilities of smuggeling, connections and can offer organizational and financial 
help for those ready to go (Zelin 2013b; Wolf 2014). 
Hypothesis: The more networks exist in a country the more foreign fighters are exported. 
The condition consists of two sub-components. One indicates whether domestic terrorist 
organizations exist that have relationships or are affiliated with ISIL or Al-Qaeda (Al-Qaeda 
as umbrella organization, including the Syrian Al-Nusrah Front). The project “Mapping 
Militant Organizations” by the Stanford University maps the relationship between regional 
and international terrorist organizations and insurgent groups (Mapping Militant 
Organizations 2015). I scored every case, in which organizations connected to insurgent 
groups in Syria and Iraq exist with a 1. I restrained from a more explicit scale, as information 
of their activeness, numbers and their efforts to recruit and sent fighters to Syria and Iraq are 
difficult to measure and would probably lack accuracy. I recognize that further organizations 
and networks exists but argue that more qualitative research could lead to false assumptions, 












      Fig. 6: Terrororganization with ties to Syria & Iraq.  
Cases Organizations 
tunisia AST 
libya ASL, LIFG, ISIL 
morocco GICM  
somalia Al-Shabat 
algeria AQIM, Jund Al-Khalifa (joined ISIL) 
yemen AQAP, ASY 
egypt 
Al-Jama´a Al-Islamiya, EJI, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis (joined 
ISIL) 
mauretania AQIM 
       For shortcuts see Appendix. 
The other sub-component is the number of foreign fighters that joined the (by then) Al-Qaeda 
affiliate ISI (or AQI: Al-Qaeda Iraq), the antesecessor organization of ISIL, revealed in the 
Sinjar documents. The Sinjar documents are records of 700 foreign fighters in Iraq. They 
were secured by the US military and revealed detailed information on the backgrounds and 
origins of foreign fighters (Fishman/Felter 2007). I argue, that the figures can be taken as an 
indicator for existing networks and connections between the countries of origin and ISI and 
Al-Qaeda that might still exists. I used the total number of foreign fighters from the Sinjar 
documents, arguing that the more fighters joined Iraqi insurgent groups, the more connections 
exist. The cross over point to calibrate the Sinjar-figures was given by the author, as median 
and quartiles did not give an appropriate picture of the situation as the foreign fighters listed 
came from a small number of cases only. 
compute: sinjar = calibrate(sinjar,100,10,0) 
I use the average for the creation of an index due to the alternative approaches of score 
creation (terrorist organization: binominal; Sinjar: calibrated). 
The conditions networks and alternatives are connected. If sophisticated terrorist or insurgent 
groups exist in a country, it is to assume that they not only pose as a network to smuggel 
foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq but also as an alternative that could motivate to stay. 










The condition alternatives refers to options other than to go to Syria and Iraq, for dedicated 
future jihadists. Full membership means that no alternative exist in a case. I assume that 
alternative areas of action for dedicated jihadists compete with insurgent groups in Syria and 
Iraq for foreign fighters. 
Hypothesis:  The less alternatives are available the more foreign fighters are exported. 
Alternative areas of action for dedicated jihadists can be domestic terrorist organizations or 
insurgencies and terrorist organization in other jihadi battlefields. The condition consists of 
two sub-components: Terror and insurgencies. The sub-component of terror is given by the 
calibrated scores of the Global Terrorism Index 2014. The index measures acts of terror 
(Terrorism Index 2014). 
The figures are calibrated using the quartiles and the median: 
compute: terror = calibrate(terror,0.165,2.11,5.645) 
The sub-component insurgencies is an estimation of alternatives in the cases itself or in 
bordering states. Alternative battlefields, that are geographically closer to a case than Syria 
but do not share a border with it were put aside.  
The scores for the sub-component follow a categorization (Fig. 6) relying on research by the 
author and then calibrated using quartiles and the median. 















Fig. 7: Details on the classification of cases, regarding alternatives 
Value Insurgency 
1  Civil war or close to civil war, with populated territory hold by insurgent groups. 
0,8 
Influential insurgencies exist but do not hold important populated areas. They mostly operate in 
rural areas or clandestine. The State has the upper hand.  
0,6 
Lawless territory at the periphery of the state where terrorist groups, training camps and 
insurgencies exist- mostly in deserted and mountainious areas bordering a troubled neighbour. 
0,4 The country shares a porous border with a country at civil war. 
0,2 
The country is situated in an area where insurgencies occur repeatedly (mostly a save haven) and 
have limited influence without holding any territory of importance. 
0 No insurgency at all. 
 
Legitimation of the categorization:  
[1]:  Libya, Somalia 
Libya is considered a failed state in the middle of a civil war. The revolutionary militas 
fighting former dictator Ghaddafi could not be disarmed or controlled by the new central 
gouvernment (Engel 2014: 4ff.). The situation worsened. Today – next to smaller factions, 
militias and groups – two mayor factions fight each other over the control and direction of the 
post-revolutionary country, whereby each established an own parliament. At the shore in the 
west, the Islamic Libyan Dawn holds the capital Tripoli, while the east (Tobruk) is controlled 
by nationalists. Other Islamic insurgencies control Benghazi (Ansar al Sharia) (Stephen 2014) 
and Derna (ISIL) (Al-Jazeera 2015b). Libya is seen by ISIL as a perfect opportunity to put the 
food in the door in North Africa (Winter 2015: 5) ISIL operates training camps in Libya 
(nbcnews 2014). 
Somalia is in a state of civil war, since the toppeling of former dictator Siad Barre in 1991. 
While some comparatively stable independent or semi-independent provinces exist 
(Somaliland and Puntland) the rest of the country and the capital Mogadishu remains 
contested by African Union forces, the national army, various militias and the Al-Qaeda 










 [0,8]:  Algeria, Egypt, Sudan 
Algeria and Egypt are not in a state of civil war but both struggle with long established 
domestic terrorist organizations and insurgencies. In both cases, remote and marginalized 
regions exist where insurgent groups find safe heavens and an operational area. The Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), responsible for the killing of former president Anwar as-Sadat in 1981 
and the infamous Luxor attack in 1997, has a long and violent history in Egypt 
(Sullivan/Jones 2008: 67-71). During the Mursi government, the organization went into 
politics and cooperated with the governing Freedom and Justice Party of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood (BBC news 2013). With the ouster of Mursi, both groups were declared 
terrorist organizations again. Since then, the number of terrorist attacks in Egypt increased, as 
one can see following the news. In the Sinai insurgent groups and terrorist organizations find 
an operational area and became, with the events of the Egyptian Revolution, more and more 
activ. The strongest Islamic player – the group Ansar bait al-Maqdis that recently affiliated 
with ISIL (Mapping Militant Organizations 2015) – waged an open insurgency against 
Egyptian security forces leading to over 100 causalities (even though, most are reported to be 
Islamists) (Schleifer 2014). Since the civil war (1991-2002) the Algerian government is 
challenged by various terrorist organization. The mayor jihadi insurgent group is the Al-
Qaeda franchise Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). It has its origins in the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA). The GIA continued attacking the Algerian government till 2004. After 
government crackdowns on the group, its leftovers formed the Salafist Group for preaching 
and Combat, that became AQIM in 2003 (Laub 2015). AQIM operates as an insurgent group 
throughout the Sahel zone. It gained greater importance when it allied with Tuareg rebels, 
conquering the northern provinces of Mali (Tran 2013; Lacher 2012). AQIM called North 
African jihadist to refuse to go to Syria, as fighters are needed in the region as well (MAITIC 
2014: 53). 
Sudan has a long history of civil conflict. These can be described as a struggle between the 
Arab central government and different ethnic opposition forces in the periphery (Burr/Collins 
2003: 28f.). Most conflict zones in Sudan are at its border regions (Darfur, South Sudan [till 
its independence]), Abyei. Its border Regions to the west and to the south are in a state of civil 








[0,6]:  Tunisia, Mauretania  
Tunisia and Mauretania, share porous borders with countries, where insurgent groups operate 
or wage war. Both cases have porous border areas, outside of the reach of the state. Tunisias 
border area to Libya lacks strong state control (Crisis Group report 2013). ISIL and Al-Qaeda 
are said to operate training camps in the countries’ south, close to the Libyan border (MAITIC 
2014: 34ff.). Training camps situated in Libya are said to be close to the Tunisian border (Ben 
Said 2015). Further, small Islamic insurgencies, affiliated with Al-Qaeda operate in the 
Chambi Mountain area at the Algerian border (Zelin 2015b).  
Mauretania lies within the operational zone of AQIM. The desert country shares porous 
borders with Algeria and Mali. In 2012 AQIM and a local Islamist group (Ansar Dine) allied 
with Tuareg rebels (MNLA) and overrun the north of Mali leading to a French intervention 
that drove the Islamists out (Tran  2013; Lacher 2012). The Sahel zone, with its deserted and 
porous borders is a region of widly criminal activity, esp. smuggeling and traficking of arms, 
humans and drugs and due to its landscape hard to control (Lacher 2012; Boukhars 2012). 
Terrorist groups and insurgencies find a safe haven in the region that became famous for 
kidnappings (Boukhars 2012; Thurston 2012), esp. with the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi in 
Libya, smuggeling of arms increased intensively (Boukhars 2012).  
 [0,4]:  Saudi Arabia, Djibouti 
Saudi Arabia and Djibouti have border countries at civil war (Saudi Arabia: Yemen; Djibouti: 
Somalia) but spill over effects are not reported. In fact, Djibouti borders with the self-declared 
independent state of Somali-land that is compared with the rest of the Somalia stable (Böhm 
2013). The border between Djibouti and Somalia remains porous but the country hosts US 
military sites and gains assistance and support from the US-Army (United States Department 
of State 2013). Saudi Arabia borders Yemen to the south. The country is involved in the civil 
war in Yemen by airstrikes and spents lots of military resources to secure its border (Carey 
2015). There are reports of clashes between Saudi security forces and Shiite Houthi rebels 










[0,2]:  Morocco, Jordan 
Morocco and Jordan are situated in a region, where insurgent groups and terrorist 
organization exist. Morocco is situated in the operational zone of AQIM and is officially at 
war (Truce since 1991) with the frente Polisario in the Western Sahara. Half of Jordan’s 
population is made up of Palestinian refugee (Auswärtiges Amt 2015). Even though they have 
the Jordanian citizenship by now, many still live in Palestinian refugee camps.27 Jordan drove 
out militant Palestinian organizations, such as the PLO and the PFLP at the beginning of the 
1970s in a civil war, reffered as Black September by these very organizations (CFR 2005) 
(Global Security 2015). Even though, both countries are situated in regions, traditional barring 
several alternative fields of violent jihadist activity, I value them low, in relation to the other 
cases.  
[0]:  Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Comoros 
Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and the Comoros have the most peacefull neighborhood of all cases. 
(Esp. the Comoros that are located in the Indian Ocean.) 
 
Accessibility [ACCESS] 
The condition accessibility refers to the practical possibilities to enter the conflict zone from 
each case. I argue that without any possibility to travel to Syria and Iraq from a specific 
country, the number of foreign fighters from that country is zero.  
Hypothesis: The higher the accessibility the more foreign fighters are exported. 
I assume, that the easier it is to enter Syria or Iraq from a particular country, the more 
individuals with the will to become foreign fighters that exist in a country, will actually go to 
Syria and Iraq. Even though, the condition does not give a complete picture of the ways and 
possibilities to enter the conflict zone. It only captures foreign fighters who traveled to a 
neighboring country legally and then crossed into Syria and Iraq. The focus is on visa 
regulations to neighboring countries and on the estimated opportunities to cross from these 
into Syria and Iraq. Passport falsification and clandestine transit via smugglers to neighboring 
countries or the direct route by seaway are excluded.  
                                                             








The measure of the condition accessibility was created by the following procedure: 
In a first step, I created access values for every neighboring country to Syria and Iraq – i.e. 
transit countries. The access value combines different estimated values regarding the 
possibilities to enter the country by legal means (i.e. how easy the entry is from a practical 
point of view, wether a visa is required and not) and the possibilities to move on to Syria and 
Iraq from a transit-country. The estimated values for the way from a transit country to the 
conflict zone include the states policies and attitude to the Syrian opposition and ISIL in 
particular and whether the country borders territories that are held by opposition groups that 
welcome foreign fighters. Further, I multiply the different values to calculate the specific 
access value. If a transit country is also a listed case I multiply, in addition, only the values 
regarding the entry Syria and Iraq from there and list them seperatly [7. Accessibility without 
visa] 
 
Fig. 8: Calculation of the accessibility via different transit-countries 
 
The outcome shows the estimated accessibility possibilities through every transit country. In a 
second step I compared all possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq from each case. I assume that a 
Best Choice Turkey Lebanon Jordan Iran Kuwait 
Saudi 
Arabia Israel 
1. State is an active part in the ANTI-ISIL 
coalition 0,25: very active; 0,5: active; 0,75: 
troubled; 1: no member 0,75 0,5 0,25 0 0,5 0,5 0,5 
2. State is a declared enemy of the Syrian 
opposition = 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
3. Border on enemy- (0,25); combated- 
(0,5); controlled territory (1) 1 0,5 0,5 0 0,25 0,5 0,5 
4. Visa costs if 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
5. Visa costs if Visa 0 0,5 0,5 0,5 0 0,1 0,1 0 
6. State is a listed case 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
7. Accessibility without visa 0 0 0,125 0 0,125 0,25 0 








future foreign fighter will allways choose the easiest way to enter the conflict zone; i.e. the 
transit-country or the direct access with the highest value.  
As a matter of space, entry possibilities via visa, direct access and the best choice values are 
shown in fig. 8: ‘Possibilities to enter’ visible in the Appendix. 
The ‘Best Choice’ scores are calibrated, using quartiles and median: 
compute: access = calibrate(access,0.3125,0.125,0) 
 
Justification for estimation of the values 
State as a declared enemy of the Syrian opposition [2] (Fig. 8): 
I assume that the transit of foreign fighters through a country is more difficult or near to 
impossible, if a transit-country is hostile towards the Syrian opposition. Hostile states are 
thought to combat the flow of foreign fighters more intensively as they consider them 
enemies. I give a hostile state the value 0 and a state, not generally hostile towards the Syrian 
opposition the value 1. The state might still be hostile to parts of the Syrian opposition. Only 
states that were consistent in their policies towards the Syrian opposition during the whole 
time of the conflict are valued with a 0.  
By this, I omitt Israel and Iran as possible transit countries. Israel and Iran may have little in 
common but their hostile position towards radical Sunni insurgencies in Syria and Iraq. 
Israel´s attitude towards radical Islamism is well known. The border area with Syria, the 
Golan Heights are Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. The area is highly 
militarized and surveiled by the Israeli defense forces (IDF) (Guzman 2013). The border 
between Israel and Syria is composed by a demilitarized zone, under the controll of the 
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF 2013). There are conflicting reports 
of Israeli involvement in the Syrian civil war, esp. regarding Israelian ties with the Druze 
(Samaha 2015). Still, I assume, given the hostile position of Islamic Insurgencies towards 
Israel, that the country is the most unlikely transit country to Syria.  
Irans position towards the Syrian opposition is hostile. The Shiite country is a strong ally of 








Alawite populations in the region. Iranians joined Shiite warring factions in Syria and Iraq – 
often with the support of their state (Chasmar 2014). Sunni insurgencies see Iran as an enemy. 
Because of the Iranian support for the Syrian Regime or because of religious motives. As the 
cases inlcude only Sunni majority states, I assume that Iran constitutes a unlikely transit 
country to the war zone. Both possible transit countries are valued with a zero regarding 0 
(Fig. 7). Thus the accessibility to reach Syria and Iraq from one of the cases is assumed to be 
zero. I recognize, that there may be possibilities to enter the conflict zone via Israel and Iran, 
by ways not recognized in this estimation, but assume that the chances to do so are 
comparatively lower. 
Anti ISIL-Coalition [1] (Fig. 8):  
The component Anti-ISIL Coalition is included to incorporate qualitative assumptions on the 
eagerness of transit countries to actually stop the flow of foreign fighters. The issue of foreign 
fighters is connected to the fight against ISIL. ISIL relies on foreign fighters (Barrett 2014b). I 
assume that countries, actively involved in the fight against ISIL, will take stricter steps to 
stop their flow into the conflict zone. Thus the countries role in the Anti-ISIL coalition can 
serve as an indicator for the countries eagerness to stopp the flow of foreign fighters. I 
incorporated time as a factor, regarding the transit-countries activeness in the Anti-ISIL 
coalition, by taking into account changes during the time-span of the conflict. Turkey claimed 
various times, to be strongly committed to the fight against ISIL (Beki 2014) and may have 
strengthend their border controll recently (Barrett 2014b), but were critizised for letting it 
happen and not showing great ambitiouns to contribute to the Anti-ISIL coalition in the past 
( Demirtaş 2014). Turkey is classified as a troubled member of the Anti-ISIL coalition. The 
Turkish policy towards the Syrian opposition and ISIL is generated by domestic policies and 
its regional ambitions and goals. Predominantely the aim to overthrow Assad and the hostile 
relationship with the Kurdish PKK and their Syrian affiliate YPG (Khodr 2015). While ties 
between Ankara and Damascus were close before the conflict, Turkey changed its positions 
and put its efforts towards the fall of the Syrian Regime (Phillips 2012). It supports the FSA 
and let them use Turkish territory as a retrat zone (MAITIC 2014; Barrett 2014a). Given its 








for foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a), the country is a crucial member of the Anti-ISIL 
coalition, yet, not a reliable one.  
Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are classified as active members of the Anti-ISIL 
coalition. Saudi Arabia contributes with air-strikes against ISIL; Kuwait created a task force 
to ban the financing of ISIL (Drenann 2014) and the Lebanese Army is engaged in fighting 
ANF and ISIL militans on its porous border with Syria (Saad/Gladstone 2014). Nevertheless, 
they are not classified as very active. In the case of Lebanon this is due its neutral stance at 
the beginning of the conflict and the lack of efficient border control (Al-Abd 2014). With a 
history of civil war and tensions between its different ethnic and religious groups, there are 
conflicting tendencies in the different Lebanese communities. 
Saudi Arbia and Kuwait take action against ISIL. Saudi Arabias airforce attacked ISIL targets 
and the country builds a security wall on its border with Syria (Spencer 2015). Kuwait hosts 
Canadian fighter jets and army personal that fly attacks on ISIL targets (Brewster 2014). Still, 
their policies towards radical Sunni insurgencies were inconsistent (also see chapter 4.1.1 – 
‘Operationalization: Political Conditions’) at the beginning of the conflict (MAITIC 2014: 
90f.). 
Jordan is classified as a very active country in the Anti-ISIL coalition. The country 
contributes by Air Strikes and tightend its border controlls with the success of ISIL and an 
increased flow of foreign fighters (Oddone 2014). There are no conflicting reports on Jordan’s 
government committment to fight ISIL and to stop the flow of foreign fighters. 
Border on territory hold by insurgent groups [3] (Fig. 8): 
Borderlines with territory hold by insurgent groups are included, as an indicator for the 
possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq and to arrive at an insurgent group. I differentiate between 
three types of territory. Territory hold by insurgent groups, combatted territory and borders to 
enemy territory (i.e. territory hold by government forces or by groups hostile to Sunni foreign 
fighters). I compared maps, indicating the territory hold by insurgent groups from two sources 










Visa costs [4 & 5] (Fig. 9): 
“Visa costs if visa is 1”: No visa is needed. 
“Visa costs if visa is 0”: Visa is needed. I value countries were visa´s can be applied by extra 
costs – money deposition; paper work, background checks (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) with 
0,5.  Countries where visa are quasi impossible to obtain (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) are valued 
with 0.1. 
The sources for visa costs and territory hold by insurgent groups will be listed in the 
bibliography.   
 
4.2 QCA-Analysis 
As said before, the QCA-Analysis is used in order to identify necessary conditions and 
combinations of conditions that can explain the export of foreign fighters. There is a slight 
difference in necessary and sufficient conditions in reality and those identified by the QCA-
Analysis. While I assume that absolut necessary conditions do exist (See. Chapter: 1.4 
Underlying Assumptions), those identified by QCA reflect reality and  “make theoretical and 
empirical sense” (Legewie 2013). Still, they are not a one-to-one reflection of reality. 
 
4.2.1 Analysis of the Necessary Conditions 
In the following, define the QCA terms coverage and consistency. Than I present the finding 
regarding necessary conditions and discuss three conditions I identified as necessary or close 
to necessary. We have a necessary condition, if the condition always occurs when the 
outcome does, but does not necessarily always lead to the outcome. Identified single 
necessary conditions are: Accessibility (access), economic system (econ) and education (edu).  
Coverage & Consistency: The QCA-Analysis calculates two sorts of scores: Consistency-
scores and Coverage-scores. Consistency specifies the grade of corelation of a condition with 
the outcome; i.e. how consistent the empirical data contributes to the outcome 
(Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 212). Coverage specifies the degree of relevance of a condition. 








emergece also in other cases with a negative outcome (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 98). 
Schneider and Wageman define a condition as necessary, when its consistency is above 0,9 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 213). The analysis of the necessary condition results in the 
following findings:   









To check for false assumptions regarding the effect of conditions, I also analyzed whether 
there are necessesary conditions that lead to the negated outcome. Three conditions were 
identified, the absence of which is more significant: Democracy, grievances and alternatives. 
The consistency scores for democracy were slightly different for a negated and a positive 
outcome, as relative democratic states are among the exporters of foreign fighters and among 
the none-exporters. Even though, the condition can contribute as part of a complex sufficient 
condition. The higher constistency of the negated condition grievances stresses that 







































Findings: Necessary Conditions  
Fig. 12: Accessibility; Fig. 13: Economic System; Fig. 14: Education 
Two necessary conditions with 
scores above 0,9 emerge: 
accessibility (access) and economic 
system (econ). Furthermore, the 
conditions education (edu) comes 
very close (0,87). The high 
consistency and coverage of 
accesibility gives evidence for a 
strong correlation between the 
accessibility of Syria and Iraq and 
the export of foreign fighters. To 
count as a necessary condition, all scores need to be situated under the diagonal (Schneider & 
Wagemann 2007: 32). One can see in the graphic X/Y-plot that most cases are situated close 
and mostly under the diagonal. Exceptions are the United Arab Emirates and Somalia. I argue 
that the accessibility of the conflict zone is a highly important condition for the flow of 
foreign fighters – esp. due to its coverage of 0,87. Still, as the exceptions UAE and Somalia 
show, the accessibility can not count as the only factor that contributes to a high export of 
foreign fighters from a country. If this were the case, Somalia would export less and the UAE 
would export more foreign fighters. Qualitative research on these cases seems necessary to 
find factors or adjustments of conditions, not captured in the Fuzzy-scores. 
The economic system (econ) is a 
necessary condition for the export of 
foreign fighters. In comparision to 
accessibility it lacks a high coverage 
(coverage: 0,61), as one can see at 
the cases far from the diagonal. The 
findings indicate, that the existence 








country is necessary to for the export of foreign fighters. It is not a sufficient condition, as 
modern market economies exist in countries that only export small numbers of foreign 
fighters or none. Again, Somalia is an exception and will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4.4 ‚Interpretation of the Cases in the Light of the Findings’. 
Education (edu) shortly misses the 
criteria for a necessary condition. 
Nevertheless, its high consistency 
score gives reason for a more 
detailed examination. As seen in the 
graph, countries with a poor 
educational level do not export 
foreign fighters – with, again the 
exceptions of Somalia and Morocco 
– and are clustered at the lower left 
corner of the graph. While poor 
education seems to decrease the export of foreign fighters in most countries, the opposite does 
not count for countries with a better educational level – these are clustered at the right side, 
but throughout the scale of high or low export of foreign fighters. The findings show that a 
high level of education does not lead to the export of foreign fighters in the same way as low 
education leads to a negative outcome – i.e. no export. This assumption is stressed, by the 
comparison of coverage and consistency of the condition with the coverage and consistency 
of the negated condition with the negated outcome (I.e. no education leads to no export). The 
analysis of the negated necessary condition education (~edu) assigned to a negative outcome 
(~ff) scores a consistency of 0.55 and thus does not count as a necessary condition. Though, 
its coverage of 0.84 is higher than the coverage of the positive condition (edu; coverage: 0,62) 
assigned to a positive outcome (ff).  
 
 








Necessary conditions can also be part of further necessary conditions that include others as 
well. Ragin states that necessary conditions including various single conditions only are valid, 
if they only include other necessary conditions (Ragin 2010: 211). 





edu+econ 0.934307 0.537364 
edu+access 0.932847 0.628319 
edu+econ 0.934307 0.537364 
econ+access 0.929927 0.608405 
edu+econ+access 0.935766 0.537752 
         
As one can see, the consistency scores of the necessary conditions that include other 
necessary conditions, are slightly higher than those of single necessary conditions. This is 



















A visualtization of the necessary conditions accessibility, economic system and the quasi 
necessary condition education illustrates the findings. 
  
The graph shows – as did the findings – that most countries, that export foreign fighters rank 
high in terms of education, have a modern market system and share good possibilities to 
travel to Syria and Iraq. The graph strenghtens the importance of accessibility to the conflict 
zone. In difference to the previous findings, it makes exemptions visible, taking into account 
all three necessary and quasi necessary conditions. While Somalia – as the findings indicated 
– sticks out with a higher export of foreign fighters coinciding with a diminishing low 
education and a more or less not existing modern market economy, the cases of the United 
Arab Emirates (and to a lesser extend the case of Algeria) stick out as countries exporting less 
foreign fighters than the findings would let one assume. The UAE scores high in both, 
education and economic system. The score for accessibility is similar to Qatars score. Still, 
the UAE exports fewer foreign fighters than Qatar. While the previous analysis of the 
necessary conditions identified single conditions posing relevant for the export of foreign 
fighters and threw a glance on cases sticking out as exemptions, a further analysis is required 
to identify the sufficient conditions and combinations of such.  








The complex sufficient conditions are analyzed with the use of a Fuzzy-Set Truth Table 
Algorithm. Further I have conducted a Fuzzy-set analysis of the conditions leading to a 
positive and to a negative outcome, i.e. to the export of foreign fighters (ff) and to no export 
of foreign fighters (~ff) in order to identify the combination of conditions, sufficient to 
explain why some countries export more foreign fighters than others. 
 
Truth Table & Logical Remainders 
In a first step a Truth Table is created including all logically possible combinations between 
the conditions (Legewie 2013). The Truth Table does not only include combinations of 
conditions that occur in cases, existing in reality but also logically logical remainders – i.e. 
logically possible conditions that do not exist in the empiric data. The number of its rows of 
possible sufficient conditions can be calculated by the term 2k. The letter k refers to the 
number of conditions used and the number 2 to the possible binominal outcome (present; not 
present) (Legewie 2013). In this analysis, there are 2048 logically possible combinations of 
conditions [211=2048] that can lead to the outcome, of which only 15 occur in real cases. As 
the aim of this research paper is to find explanations why some Arab States export more 
foreign fighters than others (and as the total number of Arab States is restricted) the logical 
remainders are deleted [The Truth Table can be found in the Appendix, on page.]. In a next 
step, I assign combinations of conditions, that lead to the export of foreign fighters with 1 and 
those that do not with a 0. The assignemnt is given on the basis of the reasearchers knowledge 
and the scores from the collum raw consistency. Values above 0.7 indicate substantial 
consistency and are assigned with a 1 (Ragin 2008: 46; Schneider/Wagemann 2009: 409). The 
fourth cell from below (Somalia), has a consistency above 0.9. The case does not have a 
greater membership as 0.5 in terms of foreign fighters (ff) and did prove as an unusual 
exemption regarding the necessary conditions. Therefore I assign a [?], as the consistency and 
the researchers knowledge would lead to contradictive assumptions.  
The Truth Table shows, that no combination of conditions fits to more than one case [Colum 
“numbers” of the Truth Table. The uniqueness of cases is caused by the great number of 
analyzed conditions. Now I proceed with the standard analysis. The standard analysis creates 








complex solution term. It shows all possible combinations – that score 0,5 or higher in the 
conditions it includes – that must exist to reach the outcome – a high export of foreign 
fighters. As these different combinations inlcude near to all conditions, the solution is precise, 
yet lacks the simplicity necessary to gain findings that can be generalized (Legewie 2013). 
Therefore, I leave the outcome of the Complex Solution aside (without further examination) 
and go on to the next solution term. There are two possible solution terms: 1. The 
Parsimonious Solution and the Intermediate Solution. The Parsimonious Solution is the most 
simplified. It reduces the combinations of conditions to the smallest number of conditions 
possible, the so called Prime Implicants (Legewie 2013). Ragin argues against the use of these 
simplified assumptions (Ragin 2008: 154ff.; Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 106f.). The 
Intermediate Solution “includes selected simplifying assumptions to reduce complexity, but 
could not include assumptions that might be inconsistent with theoretical and/or empirical 
knowledge. It can be understood as the complex solution reduced by conditions that run to 
fundamental theoretical or substantive knowledge” (Legewie 2013). The “selected 
simplifying assumptions” are chosen by assigning for each condition if it contributed to the 
outcome if: “prensent”, “absent” or “present or absent”. In my analysis all conditions are 
assigned “present”, following my assumption in chapter 4.1 Operationalization. I choose the 
intermediate solution term, that is recommended “as the main point of reference for 
interpreting QCA result (Ragin 2008:160-175). 
 
4.3 Findings: Sufficient Conditions 
In the following I will present the findings of the Intermediate Solution. In a first step I 
present the ouput of the solution term regarding a positive outcome – i.e. the export of foreign 
fighters (ff). In a second step I do the same for the solution term for a negated outcome (~ff). 
Each single sufficient condition – each combination of conditions – that leads to the export of 
foreign fighters will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 













well*edu*econ*noct*net*access  0.347445 0.168613 0.959677 
well*edu*econ*noct*noalter*access 0.334307 0.127007 0.927126 
well*recruit*edu*econ*noislam*noalter*access 0.221898 0.059124 0.980645 
edu*econ*dem*noislam*net*noalter*access 0.182482 0.040146 0.992064 
 
Solution coverage:   0.639416  
Solution consistency:  0.943965 
 
Interpretation: The Solution coverage defines the significance of all combinations together, 
i.e. the probability that the solution reflects reality (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 98). With a 
significance of ca. 0,64 all listed combinations, explain the outcome – the export of foreign 
fighters – with a probability of 64%. I argue that such a probability is high enough for valid 
assumptions and is usefull to justify explanations about the export of foreign fighters.Yet, it is 
too small to preclude that other – not analyzed conditions – do not play a role. The Solution 
consistency defines the grade of corelation of all combinations with the outcome 
(Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 212); i.e. how consistent all combinations together contribute to 
the export of foreign fighters. With a consistency of ca. 0,94, it can be stated that together, the 
listed sufficient conditions that explain the export of foreign fighters correlate strongly with 
the export of foreign fighters. Further, the raw coverage defines, how significant a 
combination would be, if it would be the only one. The values rank between 0,18-0,35, and 
indicate that there is not one single sufficient explanation for the export of foreign fighters. 
This notion is stressed by the low values of the unique coverage (between 0,04-0,17). It 
defines, how many cases of the solution are explained roughly through solely this 
combination. In difference to the raw coverage and the unique coverage, the consistency 
values all score above 0,9. They define the correlation of a single combination with the 
outcome.  
The four sufficient combinations of conditions that explain the export of foreign fighters 
include the necessary conditions economic system, education and accessibility. The ouput 








- States with a high level of education and a modern market system from which the 
conflict zone is easy to access are leading exporters of foreign fighters. 
- The combination of the necessary conditions economic system, education, and 
accessibility is not sufficient to explain the export of foreign fighters, but only in 
combination with other conditions. 
- The well-being of a country is included in three of four combinations. Even though it 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition by itself. This may be seen as evidence 
that the level of well-being in a country, in combination with the necessary conditions, 
increase the export of foreign fighters. 
- A lack of alternatives can drive individuals to join insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, 
but only in combination with other conditions. A look on Tunisia and Libya shows, 
that countries with alternatives, still rank high in the export of foreign fighters. This 
notion is stressed by the consistency score of alternatives for a positive and a negated 
outcome. 
- Relative democracy and secularism can also contribute to the export of foreign 
fighters. Still, both contribute to the outcome only in some complex sufficient 
conditions. 
- The same applies for inconsistent policies to stop the flow of foreign fighters and an 
absence of measures of de-radicalization, counterterrorism legaslation and mosque 
surveilance. Low means of counterterrorism contribute to the export of foreign 
fighters in cases that lack alternatives and those that do not. 
- The existence of terrorist networks is not sufficient to explain the outcome, but can 
contribute with other conditions to the export of foreign fighters. 
- The condition grievances is not included in any sufficient condition. This is evidence 
that grievances do not contribute to the export of foreign fighters. 
Findings: Sufficient Conditions for the outcome ‘no Export of Foreign Fighters’ 
To analyze the sufficient conditions that lead to the outcome “no export of foreign fighters”, I 








Fuzzy-set analysis for the negated outcome (put “~ff” at the beginning of the Fuzzy-set 
analysis) and interpret all conditions that are not fulfilled to contribute to the negated 
outcome”no export of foreign fighters”. 
 
Fig. 18: Output: Negated Outcome (~ff): No export of foreign fighters 





~well*~econ*~noct*~noalter*~access 0.224540 0.051534 0.994565 
~well*~edu*~noislam*~noct*~access 0.292025 0.142331 1.000000 
~well*~dem*~griev*~noct*~noalter*~access 0.118405 0.011043 0.960199 
~well*~edu*~econ*~dem*~noct*~net*~access 0.154601 0.020859 1.000000 
~well*~recruit*~edu*~econ*~dem*~noislam* 
~noalter*~access 
0.144785 0.059509 0.728395 
Solution coverage: 0.481595  
Solution consistency: 0.891033 
 
Interpretation: Both, the solution coverage and the solution consistency are lower than for 
the positive outcome. Still, the values help to identify patterns and combinations of conditions 
that contribute to “no export of foreign fighters”: 
- Most strikingly, one can see that the absence of well-being and accessibilty are present 
in all combinations that explain the negated outcome. I argue that the combination of 
low development, high poverty rates and inaccessibility to the conflict zone, decrease 
the probability that a state exports foreign fighters. Nevertheless, both conditions are 
not by themselve sufficient, but only in combination with other conditions. 
- More different combinations lead to a negated than to a positive outcome. The 
combination of conditions that explain why states do not export foreign fighters are 








- A high level of education and a modern market system are necessary conditions for 
the export of foreign fighters. They are included in every combination that leads to a 
positive outcome. Otherwise their negation does not always occur in combinations 
leading to no export. Still, the absence of a high level of education and a modern 
market economic occurs often in the different combinations. 
- The condition counterterrorism appears in four of five combinations leading to a 
negated outcome. Apparently, consistent policies towards the foreign fighter issue (de-
radicalization campaigns, the surveilance of mosques and counterterrorism legislation) 
contribute to ‘no export of foreign fighters’. 
- Moreover, the existence of alternatives, an Islamic judicial system and the absence of 
a democratic system, grievances and a recruitment pool, contribute – as part of a 
combination of conditions – to no export of foreign fighters. 
  
4.4 Interpretation of the Cases in the Light of the Findings 
I shall now discuss the outcome of my analysis for the selected countries. The countries will 
be divided into three groups: (i) Countries that export a high number of foreign fighters 
(Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco); Countries that export a medium number 
of foreign fighters (Qatar and Kuwait); Countries, that export none or only small numbers of 
foreign fighters (Sudan, Mauretania, Algeria, Djibouti, Comoros, Egypt and Algeria). There 
are also two cases (Somalia and United Arab Emirates) that are not in line with my main 
results. In the following, I shall refer to them as ‘odd cases’. In order to explain the odd cases, 
I rely on qualitative research. (Somalia exports more foreign fighters as other more or less 
structural equal states. The United Arab Emirates export less than one would expect on the 
basis of my analysis.) I shall rely on qualitative research to account for the odd cases.   
Therefore I will give exemplary terms of complex sufficient solutions that explain the 
outcome for specific cases, given by the QCA-Output. 
The Top Exporters:  Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan 
The great flow of foreign fighters from Tunisa, Libya and Saudi Arabia to Syria and Iraq can 








  well+edu+econ+noct+net+access → ff (Export of foreign fighters) 
Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia are comparatively well-off, rate high in terms of education 
and share a globalized and modern market system. Moreover, their governments did not 
and/or do not constistently apply effective policies of de-radicalization and mosque 
surveillance to stop the flow of foreign fighters. With the events of the Arab Spring, Libya 
and Tunisia got through a time of political turmoil. In Tunisia, the newly established 
democratic government found it difficult (and was reportedly unwilling during the Ennahda 
Government) to stop the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq (Wolf 2014). Libya slided 
into civil war after the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi. The new government was incapable to deal 
with the issue and several officials supported foreign fighter recruitment and transfer openly 
(Abouzeid 2013; MAITIC 2014: 32). Libya moreover plays a crucial role for Tunisian foreign 
fighters. Reportedly, Tunsians were trained in Libya before travelling to Syria and Iraq or 
departed from Libya to the conflict zone (Ben Said 2015). Moreover Tunisian fighters fills the 
ranks of radical Islamic Insurgent groups in Libya (Reidy 2015). Saudi Arabia’s policy 
towards the flow of foreign fighters has changed during the Syrian crisis. Saudi Arabia ranks 
high in terms of counterterrorism policies and takes actively part in the Anti-ISIL coalition, 
but the country did not take strong actions at the beginning of the conflict and was sympathic 
to Islamic insurgent groups that welcomed foreign fighters. The conflict zone is easily 
accessible from Libya and Tunisa via Turkey. Even though Saudi Arabian foreign fighters 
need a visa for Turkey, their chances to enter the conflict zone via Lebanon or directly (esp. at 
the beginning of the conflict) make for a rather easy accessibility. Terrorist networks with 
connections to insurgent groups in the conflict zone, exist in all three countries. Esp. Saudi 
Arabia, is a traditional exporter of foreign fighters to jihad battlefield all over the world 
(Hegghammer 2011b: 61; Zelin 2014a: 10). It seems that long established ties, transit routes 
and networks are essential to explain the number of Saudi citizens leaving to, yet another, 
jihadi battlefield. In Tunisa and Libya, radical Islamic groups established themselves 
increasingly with the fall of the ancient regimes. Their strenght increased with the release of 
Islamic radicals from prisons, after the fall of the old regimes (Wolf 2014). In Tunisia and 
Libya, the affiliated groups Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) and Ansar al-Sharia Libya (ASL) 








government and to recruit fighters for affiliated insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq (Zelin 
2014b). This suggests that the combination of a comparatively high value for well-being, a 
higher level of education, a modern market system and established networks and 
comparatively easy accessibility to Syria and Iraq lead to the export of foreign fighters, esp. 
when the state is either incapable or reluctant to tackle the flow of foreign fighters. Given the 
high number of Tunisian foreign fighters in Libya and taking into account that Libya is an 
operational area for Islamic insurgent groups, the potential for foreign fighters in Tunisia and 
Libya countries is higher, than in other countries. Thereby Jordan, that also shares a modern 
market economy, relative well-being, education and easy access to the conflict zone via 
Turkey, did in export less than Tunisia. That may rely on it´s sophisticated security apparatus 
cracking down on recruitment cells or at the identified lack of networks. 
Jordan and Morocco show similarities with Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia. The conflict 
zone is easibly accessible via Turkey. Moreover, they have a modern market economy and a 
higher level of education. Unlike the previous three cases, however, potential fighters in 
Jordan and Morocco do not have many alternatives. Both states are politically comparatively 
stable and their policies towards foreign fighters and Islamic radicalization is reasonably 
consistent. Morocco is the only high ranking export country with a less than 0,5 membership 
in terms of well-being, i.e. the country is poorer and less developed than the other top 
exporters. Still, the country is better off than most of the countries that only export few 
foreign fighters. From those, Egypt, Algeria and the UAE rank higher in terms of well-being. 
The UAE are an odd case that will be discussed later. That Morocco does not rank lower or 
Egypt and Algeria higher can be answered with regard to their economic system.  
 
The Rich in the Middle: Kuwait & Qatar 
Qatar and Kuwait rank in the middle regarding the export of foreign fighters. The sufficient 
combination of conditions explaining the outcome of both countries is the following: 
well+edu+econ+noct+noalter+access → ff (Export of foreign fighters) 
Both states are Oil rich Gulf States with inconsistent policies towards the flow of foreign 








(Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia), there are no identified terrorist networks and potential 
fighters have little alternatives. There are three main reason for these differences. Firstly, the 
conflict zone is harder to access from Kuwait and Qatar than from the high ranking countries. 
Once the other necessary conditions are given, accessibility seems to be the decisive factor. 
The following graph, shows the nuances of accessibility from the different countries and 
supports this claim. 









Secondly, no strong networks between organizations in the two states and insurgent groups in 
Syria and Iraq could be identified. In both cases, though, recent connections are reported by 
sources, not taken into account for the operationalization of the condition networks (MAITIC 
2014). I assume, that even with recent connections, the lack of established terrorist 
organizations or historical grown connections through past foreign fighter movements (sinjar-
records), explains a lesser export, because fighters can not rely on existing and tested financial 
and operational support. Thirdly, and more spekulative but still relevant: In both countries a 
majority of the population are immigrant workers (Malit/Youha 2013; GLMM 2013). In my 
analysis I used the ratio of foreign fighters to the total population, as the definition of foreign 
fighters and the data used do not indicate whether a foreign fighter from a particular country 
is a citizen or only a resident of it. Immigrants that came to work to a country may be 
expected to be less likely to leave the country as foreign fighters. If one calculates the number 








countries rank higher in the export of foreign fighters (Kuwait would export 7 instead of 2 per 
100.000; Qatar would export 6 instead of 1).   
  
The None-Exporters: Sudan, Mauretania, Djibouti, Comoros, Egypt, Algeria 
The combinations of conditions that are sufficient to explain “no export of foreign fighters”, 
are more heterogeneous and on average include more conditions than those who explain a 
positive outcome. The most striking similarity is, that countries that do not export foreign 
fighters are poorer and less developed. This is in line with Hegghammer’s and Heinsohn’s 
claim that the poor do not fight for ideologies but for their daily survival. Another striking 
similarity is, that these countries lack accessibility to the conflict area: because of poverty, 
potential fighters may lack the financial means to travel to the conflict stricter and thees 
countries have stricter visa regulations. While a modern market system and a higher level of 
education are seen as necessary for the export of foreign fighters, they do are not necessary if 
negated, i.e. they are not part of all combinations of conditions that lead to the outcome “no 
export of foreign fighters”. Countries that have either a high level of education or a modern 
market system but do not fulfill the other conditions, export low numbers of foreign fighters 
or none (e.g. Mauretania was valued as a modern market economy, but rates low in terms of 
education. Egypt, on the other side, was not identified as a modern market economy but rates 
high in terms of education. Both countries only export compatively low numbers of foreign 
fighters.) This shows the relevance of the cumulative effects of these two necessary 
conditions: The combination of a modern market system and high levels of education make 
the export of foreign fighters more likely. With regard to the conditions democracy and Islam, 
the findings suggest, that the existence of an autocratic and Islamic state can reduce the flow 
of foreign fighters. Note that the democratic countries in the sample, which export many 
foreign fighters, are mainly new and not well established democracies and, therefore, more 
vulnerable for extremism. Also, a democracy could be a cause of grievances for radical 
Muslims as they see it as an apostate system (Gause 2005). My findings show that states with 
comparatively smaller numbers of foreign fighters (Mauretania, Sudan, Comoros and the 
UAE) are more often based on Islam. The Comoros are an example of a more or less 








export a single foreign fighter. Another feature of countries exporting comparatively smaller 
numbers of fighters (with few exceptions) is that their policies towards the subject are more 
consistent. There are two explanations that can fit for two different types of cases. The first 
type of cases are countries where the phenomenon does not exist to an extent that make strong 
actions necessary. These countries mostly lack one or more of the other necessary conditions 
(e.g. Comoros, Djibouti, Sudan, Mauretania). The other type of cases are states, where means 
of de-radicalization, surveilance and consistent counterterrorism and anti-foreign fighter 
policies may lead to small numbers of foreign fighters. Algeria and the UAE are of this latter 
Type.  
The case of Algeria which is a low export country seems more difficult as it ranks higher than 
other cases with regard to the conditions economic system and education.The sufficient 
combination of conditions leading to a small export of foreign fighters from Algeria is the 
following. 
~well*~dem*~griev*~noct*~noalter*~access → ~ff (no export of foreign fighters) 
The combination of counterterrorism and alternatives is seen by researchers as an explanation 
for comparatively low numbers of Algerian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014: 
53ff.). As stated before, AQIM´s competes openly over fighters with insurgent groups in 
Syria and Iraq (Watanabe 2015;MAITIC 2014: 43f.). Moreover Algeria is an authoritarian 
polic state and one of three cases in the sample that tackle terrorism and foreign fighters most 
consistently. Foreign fighters are criminalized since 1966 and the country screens sermons for 
Friday prayers and only approves state imams (US State Department 2013).  
 
The “Odd Cases”:  United Arab Emirates & Somalia 
United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates do not fit the condition pattern of low exporting countries. The 
country is comparatively very well off, rates high in terms of education and has a globalized 
modern market economy. The identified accessibility of Syria and Iraq is the same as it is for 
Qatar that exports far more foreign fighters. Still, only two individuals per one million 








explain the case of the UAE was found. To explain this, one may look to the scores of certain 
conditions that were identified as relevant in the analysis of other cases: Mainly, the UAE is 
an authoritarian state with a consistent policy to stop the flow of foreign fighters which is 
shown by its foreign policy. The country contributed to the ANTI-ISIL coalition with 
airstrikes and delivers secularist factions in Libya with arms – and whereby entered a proxy 
war with Qatar, that delivers the opposite side (Wehrey 2014). Moreover, no terrorist 
networks were identified in the UAE.  
Somalia 
Somalia is another odd case because in terms of exported fighters it ranges in the middle even 
though it fulfills a combination of conditions that, in other cases was found to lead to smaller 
number of foreign fighters.  
The sufficient combination of conditions that lead to ‘no export of foreign fighters’ is the 
following: 
~well*~recruit*~edu*~econ*~dem*~noislam*~noalter*~access → ~ff (no export of foreign 
fighters) 
How, then, can we account for the mysterious case of Somalia, a country that itself attracts 
foreign fighters (Pantucci 2013). There are no detailed reports on Somali foreign fighters in 
Syria and one can only try an educated guess. Not all, or even most, of the Somalian fighters 
in Syria came directly from Somalia to the conflict area but from Western countries. 28 Somali 
‘foreign fighters’ that lived in western countries and than decided to go back to Somalia are 
not a new phenomenon (Campbell 2015). An example on reports that could let to confusion 
regarding the origin of Somali foreign fighters is the following article: “Somalia: Three 
Somali jihadists fighting for ISIS killed in Syria” (Horseed Media 2015). The article from a 
Somali news organization, refers thereby to Somalis holding Swedish citizenships. It is not 
precisly made clear, in the sources used, how such cases were classified. Also, the same could 
                                                             
28 Because of the methodology used by ICSR and the Soufan group empoloyed in this analysis, there is the 
possibility of Somalis that lived in a third country prior to their departure to Syria and Iraq. The figures 
are based on official estimates by governments as well as on research of media reports and publications 
by insurgent groups. Given that there is very little of a functioning state in Somalia, I take it that the 








account for other cases. Nevertheless, it seems like the hint to a possible answer that could 
explain the unfitting high number of Somalian foreign fighters.  
 
5 Conclusion 
My findings suggest that countries with the following features export a proportionally higher 
number of foreign fighters than others with different structural conditions a modern market 
economy in conflict with values of a clientistic society; a higher level of education leading to 
expectation that in many cases go unfulfilled; and comparatively easy access to the area of 
conflict.   
Moreover, foreign fighters are predominantly recruited from more developed countries. 
Though they often suffer internally from terrorism and violent conflict as well. The 
underdeveloped and poor countries export the smallest ratio of foreign fighters (as measured 
against their population size). (Somalia is a remarkable exception to this rule of thumb.) 
Those who do not struggle for their daily survival find themselves with great expectations, 
often caused by gloablization and better education that are not fullfilled. The export of foreign 
fighters could, then, be explained by the so called ‘Tocqueville-Paradox’ (Esser 1999: 385ff.). 
It is relative frustration, it seems, that drives those to become foreign fighters, who are 
objectively better off than they were in earlier days, but whose even greater subjective 
expectations have been frustrated. 
To some extend, my findings also show that the coexistence of secular and religious 
institutions (e.g. secular vs. Sharia law) has an effect on the export of foreign fighters – which 
is weaker though than the effect of the conditions ‘education’, ‘well-being’ and ‘economic 
system’. I argue that societies which are thoroughly regulated by Islamic law produce 
comparatively less individuals confused about their identity and, for this reason, comparativly 
less foreign fighters. In this regard, Saudi Arabia is an exception.  
Also, newly established or shaky democratic institutions may foster the export of foreign 
fighters, as their institutions are often unable to meet the demands of the population and to 








Moreover, one can argue that they bring about a clash of egalitarian and universalistic 
democracy values on one hand with values of a clientilistic society on the other.  
In a situation in which traditional conceptions of value and meaning – be they of a religious or 
clientelistic kind - are challenged, Salafism and jihad may seem to give attractive answers to 
the unsettled. Both give a purpose for ones life and a sense of identity and belonging. At the 
same time and esp. with the proclamation of a Caliphate, they create new opportunities for 
social success: to raise ones social status, to gain a position of leadership or even to become a 
hero, or simply to build a new life in the Islamic State.  
Another relevant factor are inconsistent and ineffective policies to prevent individuals from 
becoming foreign fighters. A lack of sound anti-foreign fighter policies and weak means of 
mosque surveillance and de-radicalization were identified as a condition that increases – in 
combination with other conditions – the export of foreign fighters. This is true in, particular, 
for the Arab spring states in the midst of political turmoil. They showed great inconsistency in 
their efforts and a lack of capability to contain the export of foreign fighters.  It is also true for 
the Gulf States Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait which play a prominent role in Middle 
Eastern politics. Among the practical conditions, esp. the existence of networks and the 
accessibility to the conflict zone proofed to relevant. While the existence of networks can 
increase the export of foreign fighters as part of a (complex) sufficient condition, the 
accessibility was identified as a strong necessary condition. It is therefore to assume, that, 
even though, clandestine possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq illegally exist, low opportunity 
costs of access plays a crucial role for the export of large numbers of foreign fighters.  
Practical Conclusions 
An obvious but controversial solution to immediately decrease the flow of foreign fighters to 
Syria and Iraq would be to further restrict visa regulations in numerous countries. However, 
given the widespread alternatives to engage in jihad throughout the middle east, this would 
probably lead to an increase of foreign fighters in other jihadi battlefield – esp. in a situation 
in which potential fighters are thrilled by the seemingly invincible strength of ISIL and 
attracted by ISIL’s sophisticated recruitment machine. 
If one focusses on the underlying causes why youth from more or less better off countries join 








social opportunities (first and foremost jobs) for them and develop their capability to meet 
reasonable expectations; also alternative narratives about a meaningful life that are consistent 
and practicable must be promoted. The legitmate expectations of the young have to be met by 
institutions and social policies that do not only entertain modern ideas of freedom, equality 
and market capitalism as a matter of high moral ideals, but actually deliver prosperty and 
opportunities to progress for all members of society and not only for a privileged and 
prosperous minority.  
However, any attempt to do so will be contested by the very problem at hand. Violent 
extremism. Violent extremism (e.g. terror attacks and assasinations of secular politicians in 
Tunisia) does not only pose a direct threat to progressives, but also fosters authoritarianism. 
Benefiting are repressive governments and elites aiming to keep the status quo or to improve 
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Appendix (I): Abbrevations 
fsQCA-Shortcuts     
Well-Being:    well 
Recruitment Pool:   recruit 
Education:    edu 
Economic System:   econ 
Political System:   dem 
Islam:     noislam 
Grievances:    griev 
Counterterrorism:   noct 
Networks:    net 
Alternatives:    noalter 
Accessibility:    access 
 
Other Shortcuts & Names   
Al-Qaeda & Affiliates 
AQ:     Al-Qaeda  
AQIM:     Al-Qaeda in the Magreb 
AQAP:     Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular 
AQI:     Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Predecessor Organization of ISIL; by 
     than also under the name ISI.) 
ANF:     Al-Nusrah Front  
JAN:     Jabhat Al-Nusrah  
 
ISIL & Affiliates 
ISIL:     The Islamic State in the Levant  
ISIS:     Islamic State in al-Sham (Arabic acronym: daesh, داعش) 
IS:     Islamic State 
ISI:     Islamic State in Iraq (Also reffered by AQI) 
 
Further Groups & Organizations 
ASL:     Ansar Al-Shariah Libya (Connections with AQ & ISIL) 
AST:     Ansar Al-Shariah Tunisia (Connections to AQ & ISIL) 








FJP:     Freedom and Justice Party (by Egyptian MBs) 
FSA:     Free Syrian Army  
GIA:     Armed Islamic Group (Predecessor of GSPC) 
GICM:     Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Connections with 
     AQ) 
GSPC:     Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Maghreb;  
     Predecessor of AQIM) 
IDF:     Israeli Defense Forces 
IG:     The Islamic Group (Connections with AQ) 
LIFG:     Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Connections with AQ) 
MB:     Muslim Brotherhood 
MNLA     National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad  
     (Azawad=Tuareg; I.e. Tuareg Rebels in Mali) 
PFLP:     Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PKK:     Kurdistans Workers Party 
PLO:     Palestinian Liberation Organization 
UNDOF:    United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan  
     Heights) 
YPG:     Peoples Protection Unites (Marxist, predominantly  
     Kurdish) 
Al-Shabab    Somali militia affiliated with AQ (trans. The youth). 
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis   Sinai insurgent group affilliated with ISIL (trans.  
     Supporters of the holy house, i.e. Jerusalem). 
Ansar Dine    Islamist Tuareg Militia in Mali/Sahel; affiliated with AQ 
     (trans. Supporters of faith). 
Baathism    In this research paper, reffering to the Iraqi Baathist  
     Party, I.e. Strongmen from the era of Saddam Hussein. 
Boko Haram    Nigerian militia; affiliated with ISIL, previously  
     affiliated to AQ (trans. western education is sinfull). 
Ennahda    Renaissance Party Tunsian Islamist Party, connected to 
     the international MB, but more secular.  
Frente Polisario   Sahawari/socialist rebel movement in Western Sahara. 
Hezbullah     Lebanese Shiite militia (trans. Party of God) 
Houthis    Shiite sect; also used for Ansar Allah a Shiite militia in  
     Yemen (trans. Supporters of god).  
Jund Al-Khalifa   Algerian ISIL affiliate (trans. Soldiers of the Caliphate). 
The Khorosan Group   Syrian AQ planning wing for international terror attacks, 
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Fig. 2:  Figures of foreign fighters           (page 22) 
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Fig. 10: Necessary Conditions            (page 65) 
 Fig. 11: Necessary Conditions (negated)          (page 65) 
Fig. 12:           Accessibility             (page 66) 
Fig. 13:           Economic System            (page 67) 
Fig. 14:           Education              (page 67) 
Fig. 15: Combination of necessary conditions         (page 68) 
Fig. 16: Visualization of the Necessary Conditions         (page 69) 
Fig. 17: Output: Outcome (ff): Export of foreign fighters        (page 72) 
Fig. 18: Output: Negated Outcome (~ff): No export of foreign fighters      (page 74) 















































cases well recruit edu econ dem islam griev noct net noalter access ff 
tunisia 0,54 0,97 0,97 1 0,99 0 0,49 0,96 0,84 0,255 0,98 1 
jordan 0,74 0,92 1 1 0,49 0,33 0,01 0,025 0,255 0,755 0,98 1 
libya 0,95 1 1 0,84 0,56 0,33 0,97 0,755 0,985 0,02 0,98 0,99 
saudi arabia 0,99 0,2 1 0,95 0 1 0,14 0,51 0,51 0,44 0,88 0,98 
morocco 0,47 0,24 0,52 1 0,88 0,33 0,22 0,245 0,85 0,695 0,98 0,88 
kuwait 0,97 0,22 0,78 0,96 0,07 0,33 0 0,985 0,025 0,97 0,73 0,62 
qatar 0,99 0 0,99 1 0,49 0,66 0 0,985 0,025 0,97 0,51 0,49 
somalia 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,04 0 1 1 0,96 0,525 0,01 0,05 0,49 
algeria 0,49 0,51 0,93 0,57 0,49 0,33 0,48 0,025 0,875 0,05 0,18 0,13 
egypt 0,49 0,82 0,91 0,25 0,56 0,33 1 0,49 0,57 0,035 0,18 0,1 
UAE 0,98 0,01 0,99 1 0,03 0,66 0 0,025 0,025 0,96 0,51 0,05 
sudan 0,04 0,54 0,41 0,03 0 1 1 0,485 0,025 0,045 0,05 0,05 
mauretania 0,05 1 0,04 1 0,51 1 0,92 0,245 0,525 0,55 0,05 0,03 
djibouti 0,05 1 0,05 0,49 0,49 0,33 0,7 0,46 0,025 0,73 0,05 0,02 













































If a visa for a country is valued 1 in the table it is multiplied with the estimated access-



















Tunisia 1 0 1 0 0,375 
Jordan 1 1 1 0,125 0,375 
Libya 1 0 1 0 0,375 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 1 1 0,25 0,25 
Morocco 1 0 0 0 0,375 
Kuwait 0 1 1 0,125 0,1875 
Qatar 0 1 1 0 0,125 
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 1 0 0,0625 
Yemen 0 0 1 0 0,0625 
Egypt 0 0 1 0 0,0625 
UAE 0 1 1 0 0,125 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 
Mauretania 0 0 0 0 0 
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 










































Output: Intermediate Solution (outcome ff) 
 
 
 
 
